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Abstract  
This research attempts to examine US foreign policy in the Middle 
East, especially in Palestine. The issue is examined through three 
different approaches in order to try and understand why the United 
States has become so supportive of Israel. The first approach is that of 
the Israel lobby, and which revolves around the argument put forth by 
John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt. Two things were of interest to 
them regarding this issue; the first is the evolution and progression of 
the lobby, and the shift in US foreign policy to only supporting Israel. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, when US imperial foreign policy was first 
being formulated, there were different viewpoints regarding the 
Middle East. There were groups like the Arabists, for example, who 
filled the ranks of the US administration and who identified with the 
countries that they worked in and who also tended to be anti-Zionist. 
The change in these views, alongside the consolidation of power that 
became focused on one theme only is what interested Mearsheimer 
and Walt; the change from diversity and having different centers of 
power to having this monopoly over policy making in Israel by the 
Zionist lobby to the point where there is no more debate about who 
the United States should support – even the Arabists have disappeared 
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and were even written about as a historical relic.  The second element 
of interest to Mearsheimer and Walt is more an issue of international 
relations: due to the influence of the lobby, America tends to act, from 
a realist perspective, against its own interests in the Middle East and 
against its own values. This irrational behavior is even more curious to 
them; why would a nation go against its rational interests? This was 
the theoretical framework that Mearsheimer and Walt were trying to 
apply to this case: a nation could work against its interests when there 
is a special interest group –usually an ethnic one- that is 
disproportionately powerful especially in specific dossiers,  and which 
sways policy.  
For others it is all about interests and oil, and this brings us to the 
second approach; the Marxist notion of imperialist hegemony. For 
Chomsky, the main problematic is to see how Israel becomes a 
microcosm of something larger; there is this imperial expansionist 
American policy at the global level that is mirrored regionally by 
Israel. There is a dynamic created between the United States and Israel 
that Chomsky is trying to explain which is that these two elements 
resemble or tend to be drawn together, and because the very nature of 
the logic of power, when Israel acts in an expansionist manner in the 
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Middle East and opts for that instead of coexistence with the Arabs (a 
choice they made a long time ago), they then find themselves more 
isolated from the Arab region and more attached to US power, both as 
a refuge and a source of help and aid as well as a representative of the 
region.  
What I found from my research is that neither one of the two 
abovementioned approaches fully explains the relationship between 
the two countries, nor do they explain the impact it had on the people. 
This brings us to the third approach, which involves those focusing on 
the sociology of knowledge, such as Uri Avnery and others, who are 
academics and who tend to see how the Arab-Israeli conflict is treated 
in academic circles, and since they tend to belong to the cultural and 
linguistic camp, they attempt to see how culture absorbs these notions 
and propagates them. For some, the issue is about the production of 
knowledge on the question of the Middle East and Palestine and Israel 
in America that interests them the most, that is where you see how 
power works to create a notion of American interests, for example, 
that assimilates that of Israel. This approach attempts to understand 
how power works to produce knowledge that hides the histories of 
Palestinians and other victims – the same way as it does in America 
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with colonial victims in order to make settler colonialism into this 
kind of noble quest. To them, the game is more about how the 
production of knowledge creates culture, how power works and 
effects this production of knowledge that ends up creating these 
affinities, creating the other, and creating parties that would identify 
with Israel and the United States, thus creating the ‘other’ that tends to 
be seen as the barbarian… etc. –as in the Palestinians. For them, this 
would be the real problematic.  
All the different theories of international relations have been put forth 
in order to explain how international relations are shaped. As we study 
US influence in the Middle East, we begin to realize that a lot of this 
knowledge is “contextual” and “utilitarian”, in the sense that it was 
formulated from the viewpoint of power, i.e. how to best serve the 
interests of the state; opposing theories (such as that of Chomsky) tend 
to express a critical, anti-imperialist culture within this same Western 
society.  
However, if we examine these policies in their local, social context 
(i.e. in the Middle East) and see how US policies engender new facts 
on the ground, effect the lives of ordinary people, and engender 
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resistance and unexpected outcomes, then we are faced with a new 
outlook that challenges a lot of presumptions of theories of 
international relations, where “local” reactions and resistance are seen 
as mere “externalities” to the main theory.  
Since we are not in an American society and are not part of an 
academic structure that discusses and rationalizes the interests of the 
American government, nor are we representing the opposition to 
internal hegemony in the US political scene, then we find ourselves 
faced with a major challenge: how do we locate agency within these 
complicated, transnational processes? From the viewpoint of the 
Palestinian society, it does not really matter whether these policies 
were borne out of imperial arrogance or a Zionist takeover of US 
Middle East policy, what matters to people in Palestine is how these 
policies are affecting their reality, daily lives, their hopes, and their 
future.  
This research stresses the complexity of the US-Israeli relationship, 
which further enforces the notion that the United States should not in 
any way be involved in the Arab-Israeli / Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
For Palestine, what matters now is to bring agency back to the local 
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society, to assist the Palestinians in looking toward more natural allies 
whom they share common grounds with. It is now important to look 
towards people who have also suffered occupation and the wrath of 
imperial hegemony: Mexicans, Native Americans, South Africans, 
Haitians, and many others may pose an important lesson for 
Palestinians from which they can learn from, in order to mobilize the 
people, and inspire the power of people over the power of politics.  
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 ملخص 
يتمحيرر البحيث . لشرق الاوسط، و بالاخص فيي فسطيني تحاول هذه الدراسة ان تبحث سياسة امريكا الخارجية في ا
 . محاور اساسية لفهم العلاقة الحميمة بي  اسرائيل و امريكا، و لفهم اسباب دعم امريكا المنسق لاسرائيل ةحرل ثلاث
يدور المحرر الاول حرل مرضرع السربي الصهيرني، و الذي يرتكز حرل النقاش المقيد  مي  قبيل جيرن مير ييمر و 
الاول هير التنيرر و التقيد  المسحير  فيي تي ثير : والت، و الذي  قامرا بالبحث في هيذا المايال لطيببي  رئيطيي  ستيف 
فيي الخمطيينال و الطيتينال، عنيدما . السربي، و التغيير فيي العلاقيال الخارجيية الامريكيية اليم دعيم منسيق لاسيرائيل 
كان هناك وجهال نظر مختسفة بخصرص مرضيرع الشيرق ابتدأل الطياسة الخارجية الامريكية الامبريالية بالتكرن، 
الاوسط، وجد بعي المامرعيال كالمطيتعربي  عسيم سيبيل المايال، اليذي  مسفيرا ايفرا الادارة الامريكيية و اليذي  
التحرل الاذري في هيذه اررا،، بالاضيافة اليم . تعاطفرا مع الدول التي عمسرا بها و الذي  كانرا معايدي  لسصهيرنية
لطسنة و التي اابحت مرتكزة عسم مرضرع واحد هير احيدا اسيباب انايذاب مير يهيمر و واليت اليم هيذا ترطيد ا
التغير الاذري م  حالة تعدد الارا، و وجرد اكار م  مركز مرحد لسطسنة الم وجيرد احتكيار فيي اينع : المرضرع
بحيث لم يعد هناك اي جدال ونقاش هذه الحالة قد واست الم حد . الطياسال تااه اسرائيل م  قبل السربي الصهيرني
حتم فيما يتعسيق بالمطيتعربي  فقيد اختفيرا مي  ايفرا الطياسية  –حرل النرا الذي ياب أن يتسّقم الدعم الامريكي 
العنصيير الايياني يتعسييق ب العلاقييال الدولييية . الييبع قييد  كتييب عيينهم كبقايييا تاريخييية  والبيروقراطييية الييم حييد ان 
مسحر  لسسربي، تتصرا امريكيا، مي  وجهية النظير الراقعيية، ضيد مصيالحها و قيمهيا فيي نتياة لست ثير ال: ونظرياتها
لميااا تعميل اي دولية بشيكل : وقيد  وجيد مير يمر و واليت ةرابية فيي هيذا التصيرا ةيير المننقيي . الشيرق الاوسيط 
ولرا هيذه مي  خلالي   كيل مي  مير ييمر و واليت ان يتنيا  معاكس لمصالحهاا؟ و هذا هر الاطار النظيري اليذي حياول 
و ةالبيي  تكييرن  –بامكييان اي دوليية ان تتصييرا ضييد مصييالحها ان وجييدل مامرعييال مصييال  خاايية : القضييية 
اثنية تمسك سسنًة عسم نحر ةيير متناسيب ميع حامهيا، و خااية فيي مسفيال محيددة تهيّم هيذه -دينية-مامرعال عرقية
 . تااه الطياسال المعتمدةالمامرعال وبامكانها أن تمارس ضمنها ت ثيرًا محطرسًا، بل وان تحدد ا
الفكيرة : بالنطبة لسبع ارخر، يتمحرر هذا المرضرع حرل النفط و المصال ، و مي  هنيا نصيل اليم المحيرر الاياني 
بالنطيبة لنعير  تشرمطيكي ميالا، تتمحيرر الا يكالية الرئيطيية حيرل كيفيية تحيرل . الماركطيية عي  الهيمنية الامبرياليية 
هناك الطياسة الامريكية الامبريالية و الترسعية عسم الصيعيد العيالمي و : نية اكبراسرائيل الم اررة  مصغرة ع  ب
هناك ديناميية بيي  امريكيا و اسيرائيل و هيي التيي يحياول  رمطييكي ان يفهمهيا . التي تنعكس اقسيميا م  قبل اسرائيل
وان هيذه الحيال هيي . ن سيرية ويدرسها، و هي تحاجج بان هناك تشاب  بي  هؤلا، العنصري  و الذي  ةالبا ميا يعمسير 
نتياة لنبيعة مننق القرة، عندما تتصرا اسرائيل بنريقة ترسعية في الشرق الاوسط، مفضسة الك عسم التعايش مع 
، تاد اسرائيل نفطها منفصسة عي  محينهيا العربيي و اكاير ارتباطيا بيالقرة )و هذا قرار تبنت  منذ زم  طريل(العرب 
 . طاعدال و تصب  اسرائيل، فعسيا، مماًلا لها في المننقةالامريكية كمسا  و كمصدر لسم
ما استنتاناه م  هذا البحث هر ان أيا م  المحرري  المقدمي  اعلاه لا يرضحان مدا العلاقة بي  امريكا و اسرِائيل،  
ل المعرفة و م  هنا نصل الم المحرر الاالث و الذي يتمركز حر. و لا يرضحا ايضا ت ثير هذه العلاقة عسم الشعرب
م  مننسق عسم الاجتماع، و التيي ترتكيز عسيم اكياديميي  مايل اوري افنييري و ةييرهم، و اليذي  يحياولرا ان يفهميرا 
و لأنهم يايفرن مي  خسفيية الدراسيال الاقافيية و . الاسرائيسي في الدوائر الاكاديمية/كيفية التعامل مع الصراع العربي
بالنطيبة لسيبع ، يتمحيرر هيذا . ص الاقافية لهيذه القضيايا، و مي  ثيم نشيرها السغريية، فهيم يحياولرن فهيم كيفيية امتصيا 
المرضرع حرل كيفية انتاج المعرفة في مييادي  الشيرق الاوسيط و فسطيني  و اسيرائيل فيي امريكيا، فهنيا بامكاننيا ان 
ميع المصيال  ملاحظة كيف تعمل القرة عسم خسق مفهر ٍ لسمصال  الامريكية، عسم سيبيل المايال، يطيترعب و يتماثيل 
يحاول هذا المحرر فهم كيفية اسيتخدا  القيرة فيي انتياج المعرفية التيي تخفيي التياريي الفسطينيني و تياريي . الاسرائيسية
الضحايا ارخري ، و يتم الك بنريقة مماثسة لحالة الاستعمار الرروبي لاميركا الشمالية، حيث نش ل ثقافة اسيتينانية 
في هذا المحرر، يتطائل البع كيف يتم خسق الاقافة م  . نبيل" حضاري"ني كمطعم كامسة تقّد  الاستعمار الاستينا
خلال انتاج المعرفة و كيف تطعم القرة لتؤثر فيي عمسيية خسيق هيذه المعرفية و التيي بالنهايية تخسيق تقاربيال و تخسيق 
،اليذي "ارخير "يم وتحدييد و تخسق مامرعال تتعاطف مع امريكا و اسرائيل، وم  الناحية الأخرا، يتّم ترس" ارخر"
 . يتم تصنيف  كبربري أو معاد لسحضارة والحداثة، ماسما هي الحال مع الفسطنينيي 
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عنيدما نبحيث فيي . لقد تم استخدا  مختسف نظريال العلاقال الدولية مي  اجيل تفطيير كيفيية تشيكيل الطياسيال الدوليية 
ميالا، : لمتراجيده فيي هيذا المايال هيي سيياقية و نفعيية، الت ثير الامريكي في الشرق الاوسط، ناد ان معظم المعرفية ا 
 ;)كيف م  الممك  ان نخد  مصال  الدولة في افضل طريقة، عسيم سيبيل المايال (تكرن قد  وضعت م  مننسق القرة 
فبالعييادة ناييد انهييم يعبييروا عيي  ثقافيية نقدييية و مناهضيية ) ماييل نظرييية  رمطييكي (امييا بالنطييبة لسنظريييال المعارضيية 
 . تمال معارضة مرجردة داخل الماتمع الغربي اات  وتعيش في سياق  الطياسي للامبريالية
و ااا ) في الشرق الاوسط عسم سبيل الماال(لكننا ااا قمنا بالبحث في هذه الطياسال في سياقها الاجتماعي و المحسي 
ة الشيعرب و ترلييد مقاومية و نظرنا الم كيفية ت ثير الطياسال الامريكية فيي ترلييد حقيائق جدييدة و ت ثيرهيا عسيم حييا 
نتائج ةير مترقعة، فناد انفطنا اما  نظرة جديدة تتحدا الكاير مي  افتراضيال نظرييال العلاقيال الدوليية، حييث ييتم 
 . النظر الم ردود الفعل المحسية و المقاومة كعرامل خارجية لسنظرية الرئيطية
جيز،ا مي  الهيكيل الاكياديمي اليذي ينياقش و ير يد مصيال  بميا اننيا لا نتراجيد بيالماتمع الامريكيي، و بميا اننيا لييس 
الحكرميية الامريكييية، و بمييا اننييا لا نماييل المعارضيية لسهيمنيية الداخسييية فييي المشيهد الامريكييي الطياسييي، فناييد انفطيينا 
هذه العمسيال المعقيدة و العيابرة لسبسيدان ؟ مي  وجهية نظير  ضم  )ycnegA(كيف نحدد الفعل : مراجهي   بتحٍد كبير
لماتمع الفسطنيني، فان  لا ها  ان نتات هذه الطياسال م  هيمنة امبريالية او بطبب خنف الطياسال الامريكية في ا
الشرق الاوسط م  قبل السربي الاسرائيسي، ما يهم الشعب الفسطنيني هر ت ثير هذه الطياسيال عسيم واقعهيم و حيياتهم 
 . اليرمية و أمالهم و مطتقبسهم
الاسيرائيسية، وهيي دلييلخ اخير عسيم أني  لا يايب -رل التعقيدال التي تكتنيف العلاقيال الاميركيية يتمحرر هذا البحث ح
أميا فيي فسطيني ، فمي  . العربيي الاسيرائيسي بي ي  يكل مي  الأ يكال –لسرلاييال المتحيدة أن تكيرن طرفيًا فيي النيزاع 
أن يتنسعرا ارب حسفيا، طبيعييي  عسم الفسطنينيي  . في الماتمع المحسي )ycnegA(الأساسي أن نعيد ترطي  الفعل 
م  المهم أن ننظر الم تاارب الشعرب الأخرا التي عانيت أيضيًا . يتشاركرن معهم في التاربة والمعاناة والمصال 
المكطيكيرن، الاميركييرن الاايسيرن، الانيرب افيريقيي ، الهيايتييرن، و يعرب : م  الاحتلال وم  الهيمنة الامبريالية
تقد  لسفسطنينيي  دروسا ليتعسميرا منهيا ويفهميرا كييف ييتم تحرييك الشيعرب، حتيم تصيير قيرة  أخرا كايرة يمكنها أن
 . الشعب فرق مننق القرة
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In international politics, especially in the context of Israeli-U.S. 
relations, the metaphor of the dog and the tail is often used to try to 
understand, or rather misunderstand, the relations between the two 
countries. The notion of the tail and the dog often contextualizes the 
means by which Israel manipulates the US, or how the US and Israel 
work together as two parts of a single body to achieve ulterior motives 
that serve or harm them both.  
Understanding ulterior motives necessitates the breakdown of 
histories and relations. Understanding the influence of the American 
Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) on US foreign policy is 
relatively easy, but understanding the reasons for why the US has 
allowed itself to be manipulated in this regard is more obscure.    
The ongoing debate about US foreign policy in the Middle East 
is constantly restructured and restated in accordance with the forces 
and ideologies that work to shape it. As I will show in this research, 
three explanatory frameworks have been recently competing to 
interpret the basis and motives of US policy in the Middle East, and 
especially in terms of the particular affinity that US policy affords 
toward Israel and its interests. Firstly, we find a growing American 
literature explaining US policy as the reflection of the influence of the 
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domestic pro-Israel lobby in the United States. Secondly, the Marxist 
camp focuses on the imperial character of American policy and 
interests. In current literature, these two paradigms seem to be 
disconnected and posed in an oppositional framing of the two 
arguments. This is not only unhelpful, but often leads to the two 
arguments dismissing one another. Nevertheless, these two paradigms 
can be combined to allow for both factors (the argument of the lobby 
and that of imperialism) to have their individual role and or account of 
influence.  
Lastly, a historical/cultural argument links US foreign policy in 
the Middle East to the historical experience of America and the 
perceived parallels between its founding values and experience on the 
one hand, and those of the Zionist state on the other. This argument 
will delve into the notion of settler colonialism, which exists in that a 
group of a population, usually European and white, would leave their 
original homeland and move somewhere else to build a new 
community that is democratic and that spreads progress and 
civilization or religion, but the contradiction lays in that this new 
settler society is built upon the deprivation of whoever locals existed 
before it exists due to this initial moment of colonization. This third 
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and last paradigm is less explored than the previous two paradigms, 
nonetheless, it can be complementary to the first two paradigms in a 
manner that will provide us with a much more nuanced, as well as a 
more comprehensive picture to better understand American-Israeli 
relations, which, in turn, can also help the Palestinian people in 
formulating future strategies for liberation outside the paradigm of US 
mediation. This is also more important now in light of the current 
changes in the region after the flaring of the Arab revolutions, and the 
positions of both US and Israeli governments toward these changes.  
 
Three approaches: 
1. The Lobby 
In order to completely grasp and understand the powers and 
influence of the Israel lobby, it is first important to mark the paths of 
interest groups in the US in general.  
With the end of World War II came a rise in a group of 
organizations known as interest groups, which rallied to influence 
specific public policies. What distinguishes this type of group from 
other organizations is the importance of membership. Interest groups 
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seek to convince individuals to become a member of their group, in 
order to actively influence public policy as they attempt to protect 
their own activities. Interest groups can be assembled for the 
production and distribution of a product, but can also rally to promote 
a particular cause. 
Beginning in the early 1970s and continuing into the post-Cold 
War era, the U.S. foreign policy-making system has been transformed 
from the relatively closed and presidential dominated system of the 
early cold war into a more open, contentious, and pluralistic system. 
In this transformation the President still remains the most powerful 
actor, but he is now forced to engage with an active Congress, 
supervise a complex executive bureaucracy, and constantly respond to 
the entirety of pressures and notions that are generated by the press, 
the public, and several think tanks. Although interest groups existed 
before this time, they nonetheless became much more influential in 
this period, and have been distinguished as a major source of pressure 
on the President.  
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 “During this period, there also has been a sharp 
increase in the number of interest groups actively 
seeking to influence U.S. foreign policy. These 
interest groups have mobilized to represent a diverse 
array of business, labor, ethnic, human rights, 
environmental, and other organizations. Thus, on 
most issues, the contemporary foreign policy-
making system has become more similar to its 
domestic policy-making counterpart, with multiple 
interest groups using multiple channels to try to 
influence policy choices."
1
 
 
Each interest group became prominent as a result of a 
government policy, or a particular socioeconomic change or 
movement taking place within the United States. But the fact remains 
that the United States recognizes these interest groups through various 
statements and resolutions that call for the right of citizens to petition 
their government and to form political associations. Interest groups 
engage in the decision-making process through a series of stages that 
                                                             
1 Thomas Ambrosio, Ethnic identity groups and U.S. foreign policy (Conneticut: Praeger 
Publishers, 2002).  
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are based upon their level of communication, which accumulates into 
several channels that enable the process of influence to take place:  
“Interest groups have no formal policy-making authority, and must 
rely on these people within the government who do have such 
authority to translate their policy preference into decisional outputs.”2 
 Such channels of communication are embodied in the strategies 
and techniques of each individual interest group, which I will 
elaborate on later in this research. 
What distinguishes any interest group is mainly its lack of any 
formal policy-making authority. Interest groups attempt only to sway 
decision-makers towards their own preferences and objectives 
concerning a specific policy, which must be perceived as crucial by 
the decision-makers first, before any attempt is aimed at intervention.  
The behavior of interest groups depends on a variety of factors; 
the first is the level of activity exercised by a group, the second is the 
policy objectives of the group, the third is the timing that is adopted 
by the group in executing their activities, and the fourth is the 
strategies and techniques developed and maintained by the group.  
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Generally, interest groups affect policy by means of direct and indirect 
influences: 
“Indirect influence is exerted when a group encourages 
members, affiliates, and other publics to engage in political activities 
themselves. Direct influence occurs when a group communicates with 
legislators and administrators through letters, by appearing before 
legislative committees and other fact-finding agencies, by personal 
visits to legislators and administrators, and the like.”3 
Such strategies manifest the different techniques adopted by an 
interest group in order to pursue its objectives. The largest focus of 
any interest group tends towards public opinion, mass media, and the 
overall international political environment, which go hand in hand 
with the connections the lobby has gained among government 
officials, and the amount of money that suffices for a successful 
influence on a certain policy.  
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A climactic juncture regarding the Israeli lobby was the 
publication of the 2006 paper by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt 
on the Jewish Lobby, which appeared in the London Review of Books 
and managed to stir a wide range of debates involving key players in 
the world of politics. Later, in their book, Mearsheimer and Walt 
argued that the Israel lobby is the most influential factor for US 
foreign policy above all others; Israel is, in fact, the tail that wags the 
dog, the authors’ claimed. Broadly speaking, their argument exposes 
and critiques the three major pillars often used to explain U.S.- Israel 
relations: Firstly, interests; as in commonly shared interests in the 
Middle East between the US and Israel. Second comes the notion of 
moral affiliation, i.e. the moral obligation to support Israel in light of 
the tragic history of the Jewish people in Europe. A long argument 
follows through on whether this support is always synonymous with 
US interests.  Thirdly we find the theme of political affiliation, with 
Israel allegedly being “the sole democracy in the Middle East” and the 
US seeking to spread democracy in the region. Mearsheimer and Walt 
argue that, although Israel may be democratic towards its Jewish 
citizens, it is not so towards the Palestinian Arab citizens who face 
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discrimination, restrictions, and the violation of their political and 
human rights in many aspects of their lives.  
Since AIPAC was born out of Zionism, it is important to note 
the development of Zionist thought as it trickled into the American 
community.  
“The Zionist quest began in 1896, when Theodor Herzl 
published his classic political manifesto, The Jewish State.”4 
Herzl proposed the creation of a Jewish Statehood as a solution 
to the problem of anti-Semitism concerning Jews in Europe and 
elsewhere. He proposed that “Jews would escape their minority status 
and would be free to develop and progress like the great nations of 
Europe.”5 
According to some sources, the first successful lobby action 
concerned an established law in Switzerland, which forbade Jewish 
settlement there. Jewish lobbying applied on Washington resulted 
with the creation of exceptions for Americans. Another breach was 
achieved in 1885, when Austria refused to accept a Jewish lady as 
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‘receivable in court’; Jewish lobbying in Washington eventually lead 
to the recognition of Jews in court, and the adoption of the Jewish 
family name Rothschilds, which later became known as Austria’s 
leading Jewish family.  
During the early 1920s, The American public was gravely 
opposed to a large influx of immigrants into the country: 
“Nazi anti-Semitism and the frantic search of German Jewish 
refugees for a new home did not force many Americans to change 
their attitudes about immigration. Throughout the thirties, public 
opinion polls revealed, a majority of Americans opposed opening the 
country’s doors to Jewish refugees.”6 
It is interesting to look at the original plans of Zionism, and the 
establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine; there is no mention of 
Palestine being a historic and biblical home for Jews, and in no way 
are there any disclaimers against Arabs living there.  
Zionism began to expand in the United States in the 1920s. 
Zionist activities emerged in the United States during a time of 
isolation:  
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 “American postwar isolationism became an ideal 
instrument in the hands of the new, powerful alliance 
between the Washington politicos and the Zionist 
lobby. The vacuum created by the absence of 
American foreign policy was eagerly filled with a 
spate of resolutions supporting the ever-increasing 
Zionist appetite.”7 
One of the American Zionists’ first attempts to alter American 
policy concerned U.S. immigration policies, as the traditional policy 
of open immigration was halted when Congress enacted restrictive 
quota systems in 1921 and 1924. Legislation stipulated that no more 
than 153,774 immigrants could enter the United States annually. The 
quota system allowed 25,957 Germans to immigrate to the country 
every year.”8 This attempt was seen as a success, as American Jewry 
slowly developed upon a series of migrations, gradually alluding to a 
centralized and prosperous Jewish Community in the United States. 
Such early lobbying provided them with high positions among the 
U.S. government: 
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  “Stephen Wise, an early and ardent supporter of the 
New Deal, played a critical role in informing 
Roosevelt about the refugee tragedy and in 1938 
became a member of the newly created President’s 
Advisory Committee on Political Refugees. In spite 
of their concern and good intentions, however, 
neither Wise nor any other Zionist or Jewish leader 
in the United States mounted an aggressive 
campaign aimed at breeching the American quota 
system, which insured that most Jewish refugees 
would never be able to reach America.”9 
 The involvement of Jews in American life lead to their 
occupation of certain high positions within society, but their active 
role in the voting process lent them direct involvement and 
participation within U.S. politics:  
“As for the Jewish community as a whole, a White 
House practice established by President Truman in 
1947 has been to create what is known in Jewish 
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circles as the “portfolio”. Whoever holds the Jewish 
portfolio serves as a direct liaison between the 
President and US Jewish leaders.”10 
Through this “portfolio” the Jewish lobbyists are able to maintain 
even a closer relationship with the President, and hence a more 
prominent connection with which to exercise their influence on US 
policies.  
 While sorting through a variety of resources in search of 
information on the Jewish lobby, several factors played into the 
division of Jewish organizations within the United States, which 
created an amalgamation of Jewish organizations, some who were 
against Zionism, and the larger majority of these organizations, being 
strictly pro-Israeli. Despite this opposition in the foundational 
concepts of these organizations, nonetheless they were all united 
through Israel as their main cause. In such a development, the pro-
Israel groups, the most powerful of which is AIPAC, targets mainly 
members of congress, while bearing in mind the excessive power of 
the executive. But the lobby remains at ease since it receives 
cooperation from other Jewish organizations that run under the 
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“umbrella” name “Presidents Conference”, who work solely on the 
pursuit of Israeli interests within the executive, as well as the 
“organization of more than 30 Jewish groups on virtually all foreign 
policy issues.”11  
 While attempting to acquire the most accurate information on 
the lobby, personal narratives and autobiographies stood among the 
most significant resources available. I.L. Kenen, founder of AIPAC, 
discusses his involvement in the Jewish cause in his book "All my 
causes." Kenen highlights the exceptional advancement that was 
granted to the lobby. Kenen's former positions as a newspaperman, 
political writer, editor, and publisher of Republican newspapers in the 
U.S. provided him with the media connections necessary to distribute 
any message across the nation. Kenen's connections, for example, 
allowed for an extremely large attendance of media personnel, 
including “Reuters, the AP, and correspondents for The Washington 
Post, The Nation, The Christian Science Monitor, The New York 
Times and The Herald Tribune”12 at Ben Gurion’s crucial speech 
which, as a result of its wide spread throughout the media, became the 
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building block towards the creation of Israel.  
Kenen is most responsible for creating the connections that lent the 
lobby a great majority of its success. Kenen worked closely with Ben 
Gurion, whom Kenen asserts as the reason for his first trip to Israel in 
1946.  Kenen narrates several instances where he lobbied intensely 
with individual congressmen in order to receive their approval on a 
certain objective. It is extremely interesting that Kenen decided to 
move to live permanently in Washington following the break of the 
Suez crisis. Kenen explains that the moment he heard of newsflash of 
the impending attack, he immediately called Louis Lipsky, then the 
chairman of the American Zionist Council, and asserted his fear that 
"we were headed for a long Arab-Israeli conflict, and that I must 
finally move to Washington."
13
 While observing the chronology of 
Kenen’s activities, it is apparent that his move to Washington came 
directly after his encounter with Hubert Humphrey that lent him 
greater leverage with congressmen as he allowed for the 
denouncement of pro-Arab congressman Flanders, which I go into 
detail later on in this section.  
   
                                                             
13 Ibid p. 60 
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  The most important component that yields the use of the 
Holocaust is the notion of anti-Semitism. The Jewish lobby and other 
Zionist activists within American Jewry implemented an exaggerated 
hesitance on part of US officials with regards to any decision that 
disagrees with Israel. This hesitation arrived from the growing fear of 
being accused of anti-Semitism. This is important to bear in mind as it 
plays a major role in the success of the lobby that is still taking place 
today. Anti-Semitism served as a tool for preventing decision-makers 
from making diplomatic decisions that focus on the national interest of 
the State. This notion has become a major factor that is taken into 
consideration during the decision making process, hence introducing 
grave manipulations on the already established U.S. policies that 
foster national interest. These effects are evident in AIPAC policy 
statements, and other statements issued by congressmen that reflect 
their sentiments towards Israel. Although the Holocaust brought 
disaster among Jewish families throughout the world, it nonetheless 
stimulated American Jews to utilize their positions within the 
American society towards a solution to the suffrage of Jews all over 
the world, which ultimately depended on establishing a Jewish 
homeland. Alongside this incentive, American Jews found the means 
 29 
to create a sentimental empathy among Americans. The media was 
utilized, and the American public was won over with tears. This 
empathy was silently maintained until someone disagrees with Israel 
or supports a policy that is not in Israel’s favor, at this point the 
created empathy will allow for accusations of Anti-Semitism on part 
of the lobby, which will be easily carried since the American public 
has already shown its approval. 
The First legalized breach taken by American Jewish leaders 
was made early in 1939, against the United States quota walls, which 
ended in failure. But “Their inability to change significantly American 
immigration policy concerned American Zionists, but did not depress 
them. They were convinced that many German Jewish refugees would 
be able to find a permanent and prosperous home in Palestine.”14 
The establishment of the MacDonald White paper of 1939 
brought rage and riots among Jews in Palestine, as it reevaluated the 
establishment of the Jewish state by U.S. officials. The MacDonald 
White paper brought fear among the Jewish American community, as 
a decrease in U.S. support may cripple the developments and 
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conditions necessary for the establishment of Israel.  Such actions 
went hand in hand with the growing hostilities of Nazi Germany 
against European Jews, and hence accelerating the desire to insinuate 
a drive for American Jewry. 
American Jews rallied to express their views on the suffrage of 
European Jews. The beginning of hostilities towards Jews in Germany 
marked the beginning of Jewish American lobbying within the United 
States.  
  The Holocaust represented a crucial moment in the life of the 
Jewish lobby, as they became aware of the urgent need to persuade the 
U.S. government to rescue the Jews from the hands of Hitler. This 
urgency was embedded is several other factors, such as the 1939 
British Malcolm McDonald White Paper, which brought great fear to 
the minds of Zionists fighting for a free Jewish State. The paper 
asserted that for the next five years, Jewish immigration to Palestine 
would be limited to 75,000 people. Consequently, Jewish people in 
Israel and the US rallied against it with the issuing of the 1942 
Baltimore Platform, which arose out of an American Zionist 
conglomeration in New York, where Ben Gurion gave a speech urging 
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"that the gates of Palestine be opened, that the Jewish Agency be 
vested with the control of immigration into Palestine and with the 
necessary authority for the up building of the country, and that 
Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the 
structure of the new democratic world."
15
  The Jewish refusal to 
submit to British domination lead to "501 delegates gathered in what 
came to be known as the American Jewish Conference in the Waldorf 
Astoria Hotel on Sunday, August 29, 1943."
16
 Kenen was appointed 
by the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs as the 
Conference press officer, which lent him direct authority over any 
press to be released.  
But President Roosevelt stood in opposition to the Baltimore platform, 
as Kenen concluded that due to his status as a navy man; he "feared a 
strong Zionist plank and an increase in Jewish immigration to 
Palestine would endanger the essential flow of oil to American 
industry."
17
  
 Roosevelt's opposition spurred an intense reaction on part of 
Jewish lobbyists, who concluded that an abandonment of the 
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conference would "play into the hands of the anti-Zionist American 
Jewish Committee."
18
 But the leaders of Pro-Israel organizations such 
as the Labor Zionists and the Jewish Agency agreed to pursue their 
quest.  In opposition to these organizations where other Jewish groups 
who spoke frequently to Roosevelt on the issue of Palestine. Stephen 
Wise was a consistent visitor in the President’s office, and through the 
reports he issued back to the Zionist Council, The pro-Israeli groups 
realized the need to intervene. Subsequently, Kenen lead the 
intervention when he contacted the editors of The New Republic, and 
The Nation, releasing an editorial that began with: "We will not go 
underground with the hopes of the Jewish people."
19
  In response to 
these organized and planned strategies, The White House issued a 
statement in conjunction with the British government, declaring that 
the "two governments favor post-war planning and that, in the case of 
Palestine, extreme claims are to be avoided and the final settlement 
will come as a result only of agreement between the Arabs and the 
Jews."
20
  The debates between the opposing Jewish organizations 
continued, but in the end they were all able to convene in a 
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conference, where a majority of votes lent them unity over Ben 
Gurion’s Baltimore platform, showing once again how any opposition 
among Jewish groups was gradually resolved through a furthering of 
the cause of Israel as a Jewish homeland.  
Israel was notably one of the smallest states to gain sovereignty 
by the United Nations, yet she does not engage in foreign policy 
affairs the way a small state would. As Israel is surrounded by the 
Arab world, diplomatic activities are rare and intense; she chose to 
pursue her interests on a larger level:  
“Since the hostility of the states in the area precluded diplomatic 
interchange on a regional level, Israel pursued its objectives outside 
the region, attempting to enlist great-power support for the furtherance 
of its interests.”21 Israel seeks mainly to maintain its territory, obtain 
foreign aid towards its economic development and prosperity, and 
prevent large influxes of Arabs into the country.  
The birth of Israel marked an extremely significant historic 
record in the Middle East and elsewhere. Western powers held great 
hesitation at first, since recognizing Israel meant a complete neglect 
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and opposition to the Arab refugees and attitudes in the region. 
Nonetheless, the composition of Israel never failed to gain the 
necessary recognition by other states. Ben Gurion discusses the 
change that faced Israel when he wrote: 
“Israel always faced an array of forces in two spheres: in the small 
sphere of our own area … and the large sphere, which comprises the 
entire globe … if we existed only in the first sphere, and had no 
contact with the wider one, or if the wide sphere did not interfere in 
the affairs of the small one, then the military factor alone would be 
decisive … But there were two reasons why Israel could not ignore 
the wider sphere: 
“It contains the great majority of the Jewish people, 
from which we draw manpower, material and 
cultural resources, and moral and political support; 
the forces at work in the wider sphere will not 
lightly accept all the decisions secured by the Israel 
forces, if these decisions are in opposition to their 
true or imagined interests.”22 
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The creation of a Jewish homeland symbolized the key element for 
Zionist and Jewish lobbying even before the state was established and 
ratified; it had already become the main cause for the majority of Jews 
around the globe. The Jewish lobby now had a definitive cause; a 
fundamental focal point with which to begin its pursuit from.  
Confusion arises around the actual origins of AIPAC. Some 
sources suggest that the name change occurred in 1954, others point to 
1959. Some suggest that the name change from the American Zionist 
Committee for Public Affairs (AZCPA) to the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee (AIPAC) occurred after AIPAC separated itself 
from the American Zionist Council in order to attain untaxed funding, 
while other sources contribute the name change to the harshness and 
conceptualization of the word “Zionist”. 
“With Israel’s encouragement, the American Zionist 
Council, which played a major role in building 
support for the nascent Jewish state, initiated a 
project in 1951 to lobby Congress for American aid 
to resettle Jewish refugees in Israel. It became 
quickly apparent that the lobbying necessary to win 
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support for Israel could not be sustained by the 
AZC, constrained by its non-profit status from 
engaging in substantial lobbying.”23 
There is much obscurity around the origins of AIPAC, which may also 
be attributed to the absence of any relations between Israel and the 
United States at the time. Following this period was an exhausting 
campaign between Jewish activists around the globe, especially 
American Jews, who successfully utilized their strategies and 
connections to gain enough supporters and sympathy for their cause, 
and consequently a Jewish State was attained and secured.  
“The American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
(AIPAC) was originally initiated in 1951 as a 
lobbying committee on behalf of the American 
Zionist Council. In 1954, the AZC terminated its 
connection with the activity “because its leaders did 
not want to use tax-exempt funds for lobbying.”24 
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A great deal of the available sources vary in their explanation of the 
name change to AIPAC, although the name change took place during 
the 1950s, at that time some of the activities recorded in history 
tended to refer back to the American Zionist Committee for Public 
Affairs, the Jewish lobbyists as a general category, or to I. L. Kenen, 
and other prominent Jewish Americans working within the U.S. 
government.  
AIPAC clearly associates itself with the Zionist cause. This is quite 
evident in the issue briefings and publications that it has administered 
over the course of the years. Initially, AIPAC was a small interest 
group known as The American Zionist Council’s Emergency 
Committee on Zionist Affairs. This committee evolved into AIPAC in 
1956, and provided critical lobbying on behalf of U.S. recognition of 
Israel in 1948. 
“In 1954, the American Zionist Committee for 
Public Affairs was established as a separate lobbying 
organization. In 1959, recognizing that many pro-
Zionists supported its work, the organization 
changed its name to the American Israel Public 
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Affairs Committee and expanded its leadership base 
to include national and local representatives from 
other organizations.”25 
Nonetheless, Si Kenen was the first advocate that lead AIPAC to 
success. Kenen adopted many tactics that enabled an effective pursuit 
of the organizations goals and interests.  
“Kenen insisted that effective advocacy on Israel’s behalf needed to 
be focused on the Congress and must, in all respects, remain 
bipartisan.”26 
AIPAC constitutes the most essential core of what is known as 
the “Israel Lobby.” Several factors combine in order to produce the 
most effective lobbying, which AIPAC has been largely popular for.  
“American Jews number about six million and form about 3 per cent 
of the population, but because they are highly active politically they 
form an estimated 4 percent of actual voters.”27  
The significance of the Jewish vote was born after the settling of 
American Zionism into the whole of the American Jewish community; 
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“For almost all American Jews, Zionism became an integral part of 
Jewish identity.”28  
From the transition of American Zionism into American Jewry, 
and hence the Jewish Lobby one may locate a variety of connections 
that reflect the means by which these factions evolved and finally 
amounted to a strong web, at the core of which is the Jewish Lobby. 
One of the key activists through which we can trace the lobby’s 
development and growth is the already mentioned Isaiah Leo Kenen, 
also known as I.L. Kenen, or Si Kenen.  
“Almost all my life has been committed to the cause 
of Israel’s restoration and survival, a fortunate 
coincidence between occupation and commitment. I 
inherited legacies from both my father, a life-long 
Zionist, and my mother, a pioneer trade unionist. I 
spent many years as a journalist crusading for 
causes. All prepared me for the tasks of the last 40 
years.”29 
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Si Kenen acquired his very first job on the same day that he 
finished his final college examinations. He worked for the Toronto 
Star beginning in 1925, after which he delved into the world of 
journalists and newspapers. In the 1930s, Kenen took part in several 
activities surrounding the American Newspaper Guild in Cleveland, 
his hometown, and later became head of the Cleveland News. As 
Kenen’s thoughts and interests developed, he was constantly 
surrounded by a family that was dedicated to Zionism. Kenen writes 
about his father’s early involvement in the World Zionist Congress: 
“My father attended early meetings of the World Zionist Congress. He 
knew Herzl and other Zionist leaders.”30 Kenen’s family moved to 
Toronto in 1911, where his father established the first Bnai Zion club. 
His family was very much involved in Zionist and Jewish activities, 
and hence, Kenen adopted this dedication as well.  
During his work as the political writer of the Cleveland News, Kenen 
encountered several Republican candidates, whose campaigns were 
enriched through the newspaper. Such a job greatly engaged Kenen 
into the American political arena, and in 1932, he was involved in the 
crucial U.S. elections of Hoover vs. Roosevelt.  
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 Kenen describes his various encounters with congressmen and 
“Israel’s other Senate friends” in a way that reflects their extremely 
personal relationship. Kenen writes of instances when he was 
confronted with one pro-Arab congressman, such as Senator Ralph E. 
Flanders of Vermont, whom on June 3, 1957, described Israel’s 
acceptance of Jewish settlers into the state as “unjust to the Arabs and 
a threat to a peaceful settlement.”31 In response to this, Kenen sought 
out his Senate friends, who were floor leaders, Republican William F. 
Knowland and the Democrat Lyndon B. Johnson “to urge them to rise 
on the Senate floor in rebuttal.”32 At first Kenen was shot down, but in 
the end, he was urged to prepare a speech concerning the matter, 
which was then supported by pro-Israeli Senate members who 
denounced Flanders, at the top of which was Hubert Humphrey of 
Minnesota, who delivered a speech that was more compelling that the 
one Kenen had written for him. These encounters further improved 
Kenen’s relationship with the Senate, which never ceased to grow.  
In a depiction of the manner in which the lobby pursues its 
objectives, the element of money maintains an extremely important 
component throughout the entire process. Early Zionist and Jewish 
                                                             
31 Ibid, p. 59 
32 Ibid. 
 42 
lobbyists realized that no matter how strategic or intelligent they were, 
their financial status would ultimately determine the degree of their 
affectivity. Jewish activists utilized their strategies in order to 
accumulate a large and rich group of supporters to their cause, while 
bearing in mind the sympathy on part of the Holocaust, the 
connections with congress, and the large amount of funding the lobby 
receives in conjunction with the money it sends to Israel. All of these 
factors were already construed by earlier Zionists towards a 
production of profit for the Jewish cause. This important element was 
easily maintained and expanded to the point of a last resort: If the 
lobby could not convince U.S. officials to change a certain policy to 
protect Israel, then they would utilize their money in order to achieve 
their goals.  
“The Lobby pursues two broad strategies. First, it 
wields its significant influence in Washington, 
pressuring both Congress and the executive branch. 
Whatever an individual lawmaker or policymaker’s 
own views may be, the Lobby tries to make 
supporting Israel the ‘smart’ choice. Second, it 
strives to ensure that public discourse portrays Israel 
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in a positive light, by repeating myths about its 
founding and by promoting its point of view in 
policy debates.”33 
One of the most prominent examples of the success of the 
Jewish lobby revolves around the 65 million dollar fund that the 
lobby, in conjunction with the Israeli government, won for Israel. 
Kenen maintained close relations with Ben Gurion at the time, and 
with his media resources and newspaper connections, he was able to 
bring about enough attention towards the issue, and hence win public 
opinion through mass media. The characteristic of money comes as a 
result in this particular initiative, but it nonetheless had to be available 
in accomplishing the other strategies that were necessary for success.   
One of AIPAC's strategies conform to the mechanism whereby 
Israel is portrayed as either strong in terms of its military capabilities 
that may be aligned with the U.S. during am emergency, or as a small 
democracy that is surrounded by hostile Arab countries whose sole 
quest in life is to destroy Israel. AIPAC exercises such strategies to 
prohibit the sale of American weaponry to Arab countries they label 
as enemies of Israel. 
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There is no balance in these allocations when implied within the 
general empirical knowledge of States, whereby each State acts in 
order to preserve the safety and security of its citizens, and thereby 
acquires a military or buys weapons. For example, in AIPAC's 1987 
policy statement, one of its priorities included: "opposing U.S. sales of 
sophisticated weapons to Arab countries which consider themselves in 
a state of war with Israel or do not make peace with Israel."
34
 Such a 
vague statement still manages to imply that Israel is trying to 
implement peace, but that its Arab neighbors are not. An intelligent 
mind would realize that a certain Arab state cannot simply "consider 
themselves in a state of war with Israel", and that such terminology 
was merely imposed to further the stance of Israel as a struggling 
democracy among chaotic, war-seeking Arab countries. Does 
knowledge of world politics not assert that countries may acquire the 
necessary weapons in order to protect themselves? How can one 
utilize such unreasonable language and still manage to publicize and 
gain the support of a whole other country? One other simple yet 
effective strategy involves AIPAC's silence over the aid Israel 
receives from the United States. AIPAC seeks to provide further aid to 
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Israel by prohibiting U.S. aid to other Arab countries, during which 
AIPAC never mentions the amount of aid that Israel is already 
showered with annually. This is an important technique, as any breach 
of this silence will work against these objectives, since any revelation 
of numbers or figures will automatically prove that Israel receives the 
most possible aid from the United States. 
While writing about AIPAC, it is important to note that it has, and 
continues until today, to base its arguments on historical and biblical 
assertions of Israel and the rights of the Jews as a chosen people, 
many of which have been refuted in recent years and are no longer 
used as a basis for any justification. One important demonstration of 
the power of the Israeli lobby as well as its tactics in asserting and 
promoting an exclusively positive image of Israel is the case of Joan 
Peters. Born in 1938, Peters worked as a CBS news producer and later 
became well known for her book titled “From Time Immemorial”, 
which was published in 1984 and which discusses the origin of the 
Arab Jewish conflict in Palestine. Peters argues that a large part of the 
Arabs in Palestine were not descendants of long-term residents of 
Palestine at the time of the formation of the state of Israel, but had 
instead arrived in waves of immigration that began in the 19
th
 century. 
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Peters asserts that the Palestinians only arrived into Palestine after a 
large Jewish population already living there had established and built 
up the country. Furthermore, Peters asserts a number of grave claims 
regarding Palestinians that fled Palestine in 1948, while either relying 
on borrowed references or other references that are evidently 
unreliable, and that have been refuted by a number of writers who 
criticized her book and provided clear evidence overruling her claims. 
In an article by Paul Blair that was published in Capitalism Magazine, 
Blair highlights one of the manners by which Peters wrongfully used 
data regarding Palestinian refugees; Peters asserts that in 1948, 
Palestinians fled at the instruction of their leaders, even though, as 
Blair writes, Yitzhak Rabin writes in his diaries –part of which were 
published in a New York Times report- that he personally ordered the 
expulsion of some 50,000 Arabs living in Lodd and Ramleh. 
Furthermore, Peters still attempts to prove her point, and she does so 
by relying on a study conducted by the Institute for Palestine Studies 
in Beirut, where she cites: “According to a research report by the 
Arab-sponsored Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut, however, ‘the 
majority’ of the Arab refugees in 1948 were not expelled, and ’68%’ 
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left without seeing an Israeli soldier”35. Yet, the surprising fact 
discovered was that this study was in fact discussing the Arabs who 
fled in 1967 and not in 1948, in addition to that, the study relied on a 
small sample size of merely 37 refugees, as Blair notes: “Leave aside 
the fact that the study’s conclusions were based on a sample size of 37 
refugees. The study itself concerns the refugees of the 1967 war, as is 
obvious from its title, and inspection of the relevant passage shows 
that it does indeed refer to the 1967 Arab refugees, not those of 
1948”36.  
At the time of the publication of Peter’s book, Finkelstein was still a 
graduate student at Princeton, yet as he read the book his eagerness to 
investigate its trustworthiness, alongside his interest in Zionism, drove 
him to take a summer off and research more into the allegations 
proposed by Peters. Eventually, this led him to write a rebuttal, 
describing how the book written by Peters was plagiarized and 
included data that was intentionally misrepresented.  In response to 
this rebuttal, the American journalistic establishment that had been 
talking about the book automatically refrained from talking about it 
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and refused to publish this rebuttal. This action both denotes the 
ideological trend in America to always justify any Israeli argument 
even through lies and forged historical narratives that are no longer 
utilized and are a feud in the academic sense. On the other hand, the 
incident with Joan Peters reveals the social power of the Israeli lobby 
in more than one sense. At the time of the publication of the book, 
American magazines that had lauded the book and constantly 
published articles related to it did not publish the condemnation 
written in response to it by Finkelstein, even the New York Review of 
Books that had initially published the initial review refused to publish 
the condemnation of the book, it was the London Review of Books 
that finally published it, which took place in England, away from 
America’s controlling hand. If Finkelstein’s findings had not been 
published in England, no one would have ever come about these 
findings, and Peters’ book would continue to receive the same 
applauds and positive reviews that it did at the time of its publication. 
This is but one of many examples denoting both the social power of 
the Israeli lobby, as well as the ideological affinity (discussed later in 
this research), between Israel and the United States, that prohibits the 
US from publishing anything that destroys or displays a negative 
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image of Israel, no matter where the truth of the matter and the real 
facts reside.  
Another method adopted by AIPAC is its determination to place the 
U.S. as a facilitator in the Middle East: "The U.S. role should be that 
of facilitator of direct negotiations"
37
 Such an allocation directly 
neglects the basic norms of international relations and conflict 
resolution, since a facilitator may not be at all involved in the conflict, 
and can in no way hold any form of bias. AIPAC's statements reveal a 
sense blinded awareness: AIPAC may or may not realize the degree of 
irrationality it exerts in much of its publications, yet, the awareness of 
their power, along with their connections and money, allows them to 
publicize whatever they wish. Also, the fact that AIPAC's audience is 
already in favor of its proclamations allows them to further the extent 
of exaggeration in their writings. One additional factor is the 
weakness of Arab lobbyists, which leaves the already strong AIPAC 
with no competition at all. Kenen contributes this victory to the 
community of friends that the lobby has acquired among U.S. 
government officials: "We won our first $65 million grant for Israel 
because we had a host of friends in the Senate ... and resourceful allies 
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in the House."
38
 This victory marks a perfect manifestation of the 
strategies used by the lobby to pursue its objectives. The build up of 
"friends of Israel" among senate representatives is indicative of a long 
history of interrelated work on part of Kenen and republican 
candidates, and on the earlier Zionist implementations, which have 
created within many U.S. officials a sense of sentiment and apathy 
towards Israel. The initial proposed grant was $150 million, which 
also marks yet another strategy with which the lobby pursues. The 
significantly large sum of money proposed was done so because of the 
awareness on part of the lobby that several negotiations on the amount 
of money will be asserted, and hence an initially large sum allows 
more room for negotiation, where the lobby may compromise during 
negotiations and still maintain a large victory. Ironically, on freedom 
of emigration AIPAC writes: "Freedom of emigration is a 
fundamental human right. We deplore all restrictions against free 
emigration of Jews from any country."
39
 A sense of contradiction 
follows my observation of some key elements in AIPAC policy 
statements, for example, the strong endorsement of several human 
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rights, and the importance of the implementation of such rights as 
emigration and safety. When AIPAC makes such a statement, it ceases 
to recognize or even acknowledge the extremely problematic situation 
of Palestinian refugees that came as a direct outcome to the creation of 
Israel, and hence their fundamental cause. It is a contradiction to 
uphold the necessity of human rights towards one population, while 
completely neglecting the other. Is it not possible to maintain peace 
and freedom for all?  
 How can AIPAC sensibly assert freedom of emigration as a 
fundamental human right, when it is their own influence in U.S. 
foreign policy that has lead to thousands of homeless people around 
the world? Does AIPAC realize the possibility of a free Israel and 
Palestine? Or will power continue to blind AIPAC and those 
cooperating in this unsustainable arena? 
The discourse promoted by AIPAC obscures the presence of pro-
Zionist and Israeli groups and individuals in the United States. 
Furthermore, this can also obscure the historicization of the 
development of a stronger pro-Israeli lobby there, while it also does 
not explain how the US not only supported the creation of the state of 
Israel but also put pressure on other countries to vote at the UN for the 
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partition of Palestine and later for the recognition of the state of Israel. 
American-Israeli relations may not be simply analyzed through the 
lens of a powerful Israeli lobby that, as shown above, have 
maneuvered its way to effect key US officials, who worked side by 
side to formulate a specific US foreign policy that meets the demands 
and interests of them both. Looking at the larger picture of US 
interests, we move on to the second paradigm that will explore the 
imperialist intentions of the United States in its relations with Israel 
and many other countries around the world.  
For Mearsheimer and Walt, America is not acting according to 
imperial interests by serving Israel, it is the work of a minority within 
America that has interests that differ from the interests of America as 
a whole. For Chomsky, as we shall see in the following chapter of this 
research, America is doing exactly that, even through its alliance with 
Israel, it is working in line with the normal imperial logic: it is not the 
Jewish influence, it is not the Israeli lobby, but it is US imperialism 
that is the engine for American actions.  
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2. Marxist/Imperialist approach 
Another theory that runs in opposition to the one stated above 
represents a longstanding explanation of the US-Israel relationship, 
but which was recently reformulated by Noam Chomsky in response 
to the abovementioned paper. Chomsky argues that U.S. foreign 
policy is shaped by its imperialist economic interests. He responds to 
the Mearsheimer /Walt article by pin-pointing Israel as a mere tool, or 
excuse, for the achievement of this overarching goal. In fact, 
Chomsky does not believe that the Jewish lobby is of any significant 
importance in and of itself, but that it is utilized as an straw-man 
argument in order to gloss over and deny the U.S. imperialist nature. 
Furthermore, Chomsky argues that U.S. foreign policy shares the 
same notions of hegemony and global dominance. 
Aside from the lobby, Chomsky asserts that other factors are 
important to examine in order to understand US foreign policy in the 
Middle East. In his official response to the Mearsheimer/Walt article, 
he notes that “the US-Israeli alliance was firmed up precisely when 
Israel performed a huge service to the US-Saudis-Energy corporations 
by smashing secular Arab nationalism, which threatened to divert 
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resources to domestic needs”40. Chomsky adds that this came in 
tandem with the emergence of the lobby and when the intellectual and 
political classes in the US began their “love affair” with Israel, hence 
making it harder to distinguish between national interest and the 
effects of the Lobby. Chomsky maintains that US foreign policy is the 
same in the Middle East as it is in any other part of the world, where it 
seeks mainly to fulfill its own national interest.  
In his numerous writings, Chomsky strongly asserts his belief in 
America’s “imperial grand strategy” to maintain its position as the 
sole superpower in the world. He notes that this strategy dates back to 
the early days of World War II when the US began to realize its new 
global stance. Even earlier on, the United States was already realizing 
its need to ensure its global presence, especially at the economic level, 
as Chomsky notes: “International conflicts have been exacerbated as 
the industrial world shifted toward an oil-based economy from World 
War I, and the incomparable petroleum resources of the Middle East 
were discovered. After World War II, a high priority of US policy was 
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to ensure its control over a region of such great material wealth and 
strategic significance”41.  
Chomsky strongly asserts that the key reason for early US 
involvement in the Middle East was oil. He also shows how the US 
has interfered profusely in the Middle East and other regions in order 
to prevent any regime or popular resistance seeking independence 
from interfering in its quest for oil. At a time when the US was 
seeking partners in the Middle East, Israel displayed a military 
competence that impressed US officials, hence suggesting Israel as a 
means “to gain strategic advantage in the Middle East”42. Chomsky 
believes that the strong relationship between the US and Israel is a 
product of the US’s larger strategy to control the world. He does not 
believe that it is due to the power exerted by the lobby. Chomsky 
firmly believes that it is the oil reserves in the Middle East, and not 
the lobby, that controls US foreign policy in the region.  
In his writings, Chomsky displays how the relationship between the 
US and the Middle East region revolves primarily around its oil 
reserves, which, as long as they remain full, will continue to serve as 
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an indispensible element to US imperialist plans. Furthermore, 
Chomsky maintains that Israel also has imperialist/expansionist plans 
of its own: “Israel had a fateful choice: it could accept peace and 
integration into the region or insist on confrontation, hence inevitable 
dependency on the US. It chose the latter course, not on grounds of 
security but because of a commitment to expansion”43. Here, the issue 
is not of dependence or independence, but rather about the unification 
of both American and Israeli efforts into a single logic. With regards 
to Israel, instead of trying to chart its own expansionist project, it 
affiliated itself with the American camp in a variety of different ways, 
since the only alternative would be to coexist with the Arabs, to 
change their perception of the Arabs into an equal and to someone 
who has rights in the land they live in, someone who is acknowledged 
as a people, eventually risking losing the battles with them, and losing 
their identification of themselves as against Arabs. This was the 
alternative, hence, Israel chose to side itself with the international 
imperial logic of power, casting itself as a dependent as well as a 
servant for this cause.  
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In order to understand the developments in American power, it is 
important to look at both sides of the story. The US can be seen in 
terms of the myth through which it sees itself as product of the 
American revolution and not of imperialism; as the savior of nations, 
the holder of religious and political institutions, and the savior of 
nobility and morals. On the other hand, the US can be seen as a 
colonial power in the making; this can be grasped throughout its long 
history of intervention and policy making, and is, according to 
Chomsky and others, the correct path to be followed in order to fully 
understand this growing phenomenon of US imperial strategies. 
Chomsky believes that it is not through morals and ideals that we can 
come to understand the US quest for power, but through its capitalistic 
framework and its needs.  
In his book “Hegemony or Survival”, Chomsky discusses what he 
terms an “era of enlightenment” during which the US began to realize 
its position within the international system, hence announcing itself as 
the sole superpower that must assist the world. The fall of the Soviet 
Union and the rise of the US as a sole superpower, alongside its 
technological growth gave the US optimism to change the world. 
During this time, the US began to cling to idealistic notions of morals 
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and ethics, claiming itself as the sole agent responsible for bringing 
peace, democracy, and human rights to the world. The US saw itself 
as bringing “enlightenment” to the world, and accordingly began to 
invest hundreds of millions of dollars as aid to various countries. 
Chomsky dedicates an entire chapter to this purpose in order to show 
how this “noble phase” is but another form of colonialism; seeing 
themselves as better and more advantageous than other nations, and 
hence asserting themselves as the saviors of the world. The 
importance here lays in the fact that this new “era of enlightenment” is 
but an obscuration to the facts on the ground; as reality shows that the 
US is not in fact supporting human rights throughout the world, 
instead, it is funding various groups that are themselves guilty of 
obstructing human rights; this notion of enlightenment can only be 
seen as true or valid once the facts are disregarded; lying becomes 
necessary to uphold this alleged “noble phase”.   
This form of colonial mindset began to develop earlier on during the 
inter-war period in the 1940s, although it had not yet fully 
materialized due to the balance of power at the time. Nonetheless, US 
presidents continued to assert that the US is at an advantageous 
position, as President William Howard Taft noted: “the day is not far 
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distant [when] the whole hemisphere will be ours in fact as, by virtue 
of our superiority of race, it already is ours morally”44.  At the time, 
the US did not yet deem it necessary to intervene in world affairs, 
except for places where it held influence, as the Monroe Doctrine 
asserted. During the inter-war period, the US began to invest more 
time and effort in Latin America. US presidents regarded those in 
Latin America as “naughty children” that must be handled with an 
“authoritative hand”, and who must be assisted with discipline. This 
notion slowly began to grow, as the US began to seek this same 
strategy to increase its influence throughout the world.  What is 
interesting is that the people targeted by the US administration and 
labeled as either “savage” or “children” were the same people 
belonging to the countries that US corporations were beginning to take 
over. This clearly proves that the US intends to increase its influence 
in the world not for moral ideals, but for its corporate and capitalist 
interests. These notions can be termed under the concept of colonial 
guardianship, a coin that has often been played by US governments 
throughout the years.  
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The same case applied to Haiti, a country suffering US imperialism 
since 1915. Similarly, the US intended first to invade the country to 
protect human rights and restore democracy, the first action of which 
included the overthrow of the Haitian President, and then the 
activation of American warships in Haitian waters. But the main 
motive remains clear; American interest in expanding its economic 
and political dominance. Haiti was seen as part of the larger Caribbean 
plan for US investment and trade. In “assisting” the Haitian people to 
achieve human rights, the US facilitated the rise of dictatorship 
Duvalier to power, through which it continued to exert its power over 
the country, and intervene more directly whenever necessary. This 
new path to power adopted by the US seems to always include the 
appointment of puppet presidents to facilitate the economic flow of 
US corporations into the country, and to transform these countries into 
backyard factories for the American empire.  Ironically, aid to Haiti 
also increased, but since it only targeted US and Elite Haitian 
corporations, the so-called “American Plan” left the country with an 
increased number of unemployment and extreme poverty
45
.  
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Countries like those in Latin America were deceived by America’s 
concept of “the philosophy of the New Nationalism”, thinking it was 
an honest plan designed to bring about a broader distribution of wealth 
and aimed at raising the standard of living of the masses, countries 
like Mexico sternly believed that this would be the key to their 
economic nationalism, believing that the first beneficiaries of any 
economic investments should be the people of that country. The US 
thought otherwise, and to ensure that US investors would be the first 
beneficiaries, the US enacted the “Economic Charter for the 
Americas”, which aimed at fully eliminating economic nationalism 
“in all its forms”46. The contradiction is that although the US sought to 
eliminate economic nationalism in other countries, it remained an 
important character of the US economy.  These are but a few 
examples of the manner by which US imperialism in this era has 
manifested itself in various countries, while simultaneously hiding its 
ulterior motives with notions of democracy, human rights, and false 
hopes to vulnerable people.  
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The discourse of history can shed light on the progression of 
colonialism over the years. US imperialism today is largely inherited 
from European colonizers. After WWI, British control over the Arab 
region became displayed under an “Arab façade”, a term posed by 
Chomsky to explain the situation of British colonialism in the region, 
through which Britain would hold complete power over the region, 
while on the ground, subordinate governments lurked. Chomsky 
clarifies: “The idea is to have independent states, but always weak 
governments that rely on the imperial power for their survival. And 
they can rip off the population if they like, that’s fine. But they have to 
be a façade, behind which the real power rules. That’s standard 
imperialism”47. The idea is to create a “regime” that will adhere to the 
needs of the British government, but at the same time, seem as though 
it is a legitimate and elected government that the citizens will trust and 
abide by. The same concept is held today by the US government, who 
has and continues to administer regimes throughout different third 
world countries, and through which it channels and satisfies its needs. 
Through examining the different tactics adopted by the United States, 
one can conclude that these initiatives to “bring democracy” to third 
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world countries are but a cover in America’s quest to seek its own 
interests; to gain more resources available in these countries, and to 
expand in its global hegemonic power. This was especially evident 
during the rise of fascism during the interwar period, since although it 
brought some concern to American policymakers, it was “generally 
regarded rather favorably by the US and British governments, the 
business world, and a good deal of elite opinion”48. Even though 
fascism brought no democracy, a concept held at the forefront of 
America’s quest to protect the third world, it nonetheless was key in 
facilitating Western economic penetration into the country, while also 
eliminating many of the labor movements and leftist parties, who 
created an element of fear to Western governments. Ironically, when 
faced with a decision between supporting a fascist regime takeover in 
Italy (Mussolini) and a socialist regime (Giolitti), the US government 
opted to support the former. Furthermore, we find that the State 
Department goes as far as convincing themselves that this fascist 
regime has been “impressive” in its attempts to improve the conditions 
of the people and the masses in the country. US Ambassador to Italy 
William Philips went as far as stating that this fascist regime 
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represents “a true democracy in as much as the welfare of the people 
is their principle objective”49. In reality, we find that such statements 
do not hold true; although Mussolini received widespread support 
from the right wing in Italy, he was despised by the left wing, who 
eventually led to his death in 1945. The same kind of support 
continued over the years, as the US continued to either find 
governments it could benefit from to serve its own interests, or 
intervene in countries to establish new “façade” governments that 
would serve these interests. The experience of the US with different 
countries clearly shows how its interests are always at the forefront of 
any actions it adopts. In Iraq, we clearly see how the US shifts from 
supporting Saddam Hussein with billions of dollars during the Iran-
Iraq war, where it supplied Iraq with weaponry, military intelligence 
and training. American support to Iraq came after the Iranian 
revolution, it was not in any way related to an American desire to 
assist the country, but rather to provide it with the necessary arms to 
destroy Iran, a country that posed a threat to US interests in the region. 
Following in line with US interests, the US shifted in its stance toward 
Saddam Hussein, and, after stating that he held weapons of mass 
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destruction, the US launched war on the country, eliminating Saddam, 
who now became viewed as a dangerous and oppressive dictator, and 
invading the country, in order to secure its oil reserves. 
In each of these examples, we find US claims running in opposition to 
its actions, as in the case of Iraq, the American government claimed to 
want to bring freedom and democracy to the Iraqi people, when in 
reality it was solely attempting to gain control over the oil reserves in 
Iraq, as well as deploy itself in a more permanent way in the Middle 
East. These stances of bringing “enlightenment” to third world 
countries have continued, and with each new incident, US imperialist 
intentions are becoming clearer to the world.  
One of the major reasons for US involvement in the Middle East is oil. 
It is important here to note that, as Chomsky asserts, even if the US 
had all the energy reserves it requires within the United States, it 
would still seek out other oil reserves around the world, in order to 
ensure that no other country would gain control over them. This is part 
of the US imperialist strategy to remain the sole superpower in the 
world. Chomsky notes: “One of the ways the U.S. keeps control over 
Europe and Japan is by having a stranglehold on their energy supply. 
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Therefore, if there was a solar energy or shale breakthrough, giving 
the U.S. its own energy supply completely independent of Middle East 
oil, we still would want to ensure control over that region as long as 
Middle East oil remained cheap and accessible”50. Furthermore, the 
US has sought to prevent bilateral agreements between oil producing 
companies and Europe, in fear that European countries may come to 
compete against the US. The US does not simply wish to ensure its 
own energy reserves; it seeks to maintain control over the energy 
reserves that other countries depend on. Since the Second World War, 
US foreign policy in the Middle East has been extremely consistent, 
especially with regards to the oil reserves there. In 1945, the State 
Department noted that the oil reserves in the Middle East region 
constitute "a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the 
greatest material prizes in world history."
51
 Such statements and 
policies aim to ensure that Middle Eastern oil, especially the largest 
ones such as those located in Saudi Arabia, are under American 
control. This was partly achieved by various agreements and 
                                                             
50 Interview with Noam Chomsky, Oil Imperialism and the US-Israel Relationship, Leviathan 1:1-
3, Spring, 1977, p. 6-9. 
51
 U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1945, viii, 45, cited in Joyce 
and Gabriel Kolko, The limits of power, Harper & Row, 1972, which provides a comprehensive 
analysis of the development of U.S. policy at the time. In: Interview with Noam Chomsky, Oil 
Imperialism and the US-Israel Relationship, Leviathan 1:1-3, Spring, 1977, p. 6-9. 
 67 
institutions such as ARAMCO (Arabian American Oil Company) in 
1947. Such involvements in the Middle East mean an increasing 
amount of Americans on the ground in these countries, mainly 
working either with oil companies such as ARAMCO, or otherwise 
involved in military training. Furthermore, oil investments have also 
helped alleviate financial problems in the US, since companies like 
OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) have been 
increasingly investing in the West, where the US share has doubled to 
reach “44% in early 1970”, such shares have alleviated US problems 
in balance of payments, and "help explain the dollar's strength" and 
"the recovery of the American stock market earlier this year."
52
 
American dependence on oil reserves in the Middle East is not only 
limited to ensuring control over the oil reserves themselves, but also 
on the money invested by these countries into the US, which, as noted 
above, has been vital in saving the US market. One of the major 
countries with a stable relationship with the US is Saudi Arabia, 
whose investment in “U.S. Treasury Bonds is unofficially estimated at 
$5 to $10 billion, though it is a closely guarded secret”53. Although oil 
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companies play a major role in ensuring smooth relations with oil 
providing countries, since they are largely impacted by US foreign 
policy, they are but minor factors in the over-all interests of American 
capitalism. In some instances, as in Iran, the US government itself 
urged oil companies to help "provide to the friendly government of 
Iran substantial revenues on terms which will protect the interests of 
the Western World in the petroleum resources of the Middle East."
54
 
Such instances show how the US government views oil companies as 
tools and instruments for US foreign policy.   
American imperialism has changed the face of imperialism, as 
Michael Ignatieff notes in an article for the New York Times 
Magazine: "America’s empire is not like the empires of times past, 
built on colonies, conquests and the white man’s burden.... The 21st 
century imperium is a new invention in the annals of political science, 
an empire lite, a global hegemony whose grace notes are free markets, 
human rights, and democracy, enforced by the most awesome military 
power the world has ever known."
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 Even the war on terrorism has 
become an exercise of imperialism. This new kind of imperialism is 
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no longer about the white man’s burden, nor does it involve simple yet 
harsh extermination’s of populations, it now involves different 
strategies through which imperialism is implemented behind different 
facades of governments or notions of assisting to bring about a better, 
more democratic world.  
With the progression in the discourse of colonialism in the 19
th
 
century until today comes the progression in US relations with various 
countries. One important link to the colonial discourse in America is 
the American relationship with Israel; the growing bond which may be 
attributed to several factors (such as the moral affiliation discussed 
further on in this research), and can show how this linkage and 
commonality contributes to creating a common cause for Israel, the 
US, and the Israel lobby. These three players become focused on 
expansion, and, hence, imperialism. Whether through American 
expansion into the world, Israeli expansion into Palestine, the forces 
behind these figures join hands to increase in size, number, and 
influence, in order to promote their ideals, and expand their power 
over the world.  
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In the introduction to "From Haven to Conquest", Walid 
Khalidi writes about the paternalistic Israeli attitude promoted in 
Europe to support the Zionist cause: developing the land that the 
natives were too immature to exploit on their own, and hence assisting 
the natives who were otherwise unable to develop themselves; this 
idea corresponds to the US idea of American benevolent guardianship 
over the "children" in Latin America, and the need to bring 
“enlightenment” to these “naughty” children. This brings about one of 
the first similarities between Israel and the US; the moral justification 
of their superiority over other people, and of their desire to bring 
about civilization and development to other, less knowledgeable 
people. 
 This new era of US hegemony differs from any other. Although 
the United States replaced its European counterparts in the global 
system of rule, it is important to observe that it is currently ruling a 
global system where Europeans are no longer fighting one another. 
European countries realized that they cannot continue to slaughter one 
another, so now, the US enters as a new ruler in a place where 
“Western powers can still resort to violence against the weak and 
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defenseless, but not against one another”56. The US now rules during a 
phase that Robert Jervis identifies as that of ‘democratic peace’, which 
can be seen as “some happy combination of liberal norms and 
institutions such as representative democracy and market 
economies”57, this may be true in the sense that there is internal peace 
in Europe and North America, where borders and invasions have been 
permanently implanted on the ground, but this does not hold true for 
the rest of the world.  
In the same camp stressing US Imperialism as an explanation of 
US-Israeli relations, we find the writings of Joseph Massad in 
response to the Walt/ Mearsheimer thesis. Massad adopts the same 
“Imperialism” framework as Chomsky, arguing that the notion of an 
“exceptional” influence being exerted by the Jewish Lobby to 
“deviate” US policies and schemes into belligerence and exploitation 
does not hold true once US policy is analyzed on the level of the 
wider, global, stage.  
US policies in the Middle East are neither “exceptional” nor out of 
line with usual American Imperial practices, Massad argues. If the 
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influence of the Jewish lobby were to be made the reason behind US 
actions in the Middle East, what would, then, explain American policy 
in various parts of the world that resemble and mirror the broad lines 
of US policy in the Middle East? Even in regions such as Latin 
America and Asia, where the Israel Lobby has ostensibly no vested 
interests, the US policy has been consistent since the end of the 
Second World War in opposing all nationalist regimes that attempted 
to independently exploit the resources of their countries and their 
foreign policies.  
Massad views the “Israel Lobby” thesis as an attempt to divert blame 
for US policies in the Middle East by focusing on the great influence 
wielded by the pro-Israel groups in America – as if US policies in the 
Middle East would radically shift had this influence been absent. The 
Columbia Middle East Studies professor countered this notion with a 
rhetorical question: had the Israel lobby been absent from the 
Washington scene, why would the US allow Arabs more control over 
their resources and policies while it has consistently denied this right 
to all nationalist elites around the World? Such American practices 
have been a rigorous staple of US foreign policy, Massad notes, from 
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Mossaddagh’s Iran, to Guatemala and Chile and Africa, and, today, 
Venezuela.  
Both Massad and Chomsky argue that the pro-lobby argument seeks 
to shift the blame of imperialist policies in the Middle from the US 
government to Israel and the lobby.  
With regards to Massad’s reaction to Mearsheimer and Walt, it is 
more confrontational; he refutes the argument, whereas Chomsky 
provides a more conciliatory argument, noting that the lobby is a 
manifestation of this unique logic of power in Israel and America. The 
above two arguments provide different narratives for the course of the 
relationship of power between the United States and Israel, which may 
be further scrutinized by taking a deeper look into the ideological 
affinity between the two countries.  
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3. Ideological affinity (Settler Colonialism), in line with European 
colonial modernity 
On the fringes of these two major camps, we find alternative 
explanations posed in yet another phenomenon. For instance, Uri 
Avnery and others focused on the cultural and affective links between 
the US and Israel as an explanation for the strength of the two 
countries’ relationship.  
Avnery advances a cultural explanation of the mutual affinity between 
the two countries, noting that the historical self-perception of the US 
and Israel carry deep resemblances, starting with the Biblical 
influences, the parallels between the Zionist project in Palestine and 
the White expansion in the American continent, and the idealized 
concept of a nation/haven for persecuted religions. These parallel 
national myths and cultural resemblances, according to Avnery, may 
explain the Israel-US alliance better than a cold calculation of 
interests. Avnery reflects on the arguments between Mearsheimer/ 
Walt and Chomsky, and notes that both provide reasonable and sound 
arguments, but that the importance lies not in the arguments, but in the 
conclusions that could be drawn from them. Anvery takes the Iraq war 
as an example, stating first how it was the neo-conservatives in the US 
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who pushed for the war, most of whom were Jewish. He states that the 
Israel Lobby wanted this war, and used it to advance its own agenda. 
At the same time, Avnery discusses the US quest for oil, and how it 
sought out this war in order to dominate oil reserves in the region: 
“The lesson of the Iraq affair is that the American- Israeli connection 
is strongest when it seems that American interests and Israeli Interests 
are one (irrespective of whether that is really the case in the long run). 
The US uses Israel to dominate the Middle East, Israel uses the US to 
dominate Palestine”58. Anvery agrees that the US-Israel relationship is 
of a unique kind, and that, aside from economic and imperial interests, 
the biblical, cultural, and moral affinity between the two countries is 
what ties them further to one another: “It is no accident that American 
(as well as British) fundamentalist Christians invented the Zionist idea 
well before Theodor Herzl hit upon it”59. The idea that the kingdom of 
Israel will be reborn and that the Jewish people will return to it and 
that this will be the end of time comes much earlier than the Zionist 
political project.  While the Zionist project was a political secular 
nationalistic one, this Christian fundamentalist belief constituted a 
religious/metaphysical parallel to the Zionist idea , and this further 
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deepened the connection between the two countries and peoples. The 
idea is that the United States is the new Zion, while Israel is a 
recreation of the old one. In today’s Washington, even the evangelical 
lobby is as important as the Jewish lobby in promoting this idea; the 
ideology here is that the Jewish people must take control over all of 
the Holy Land in order to pave the way for the return of the second 
Christ. In this ideology and others, there is a similarity between the 
US and Israel in terms of their “national-religious stories”, where 
“pioneers persecuted for their religion reached the shores of the 
Promised Land. They were forced to defend themselves against the 
"savage" natives, who were out to destroy them. They redeemed the 
land, made the desert bloom, created, with God's help, a flourishing, 
democratic and moral society”60. The roots of the relationship between 
the United States and Israel is in some instances dated back to the 
early American times, where US Presidents, such as Woodrow 
Wilson, viewed the ancient Jewish nation as a model for American 
colonists: “the influence of the Hebrew Commonwealth was 
paramount in that it was not only the highest authority for the 
principle, "that rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God," but also 
                                                             
60 Ibid.  
 77 
because it was in itself a divine precedent for a pure democracy, as 
distinguished from monarchy, aristocracy or any other form of 
government”61. American leaders began to strongly affiliate 
themselves with the religion of Judaism as the faith of liberty, 
recalling different biblical stories of the Jewish people crossing the 
Red Sea and of Moses. The initial links between the two people 
begins to depart from a biblical religious aspect, and hence begins the 
American desire to establish a nation state for the Jewish people. With 
the growing prosecution of the Jewish people in Europe, came an 
eagerness to “return” the Jewish people to their homeland, which they 
were “expelled” from. This idea was further materialized by the 
World Zionist Congress, which established a plan to return the Jews to 
their homeland in six years
62
. Moreover, Avnery pinpoints the 
relationship between America and Israel in his article “AMERICA! 
AMERICA!”, where he attempted to clearly answer the question of 
why does the United States support Israel so strongly; as he embarks 
on many possibilities, he notes the following: 
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“I believe that the reason is more profound: the 
identification of the Zionist enterprise with the 
foundations of America. The Puritans who founded 
American society believed in the Bible, knew 
Hebrew, bore Biblical names, saw themselves as the 
“New Israel”, called their country the “New 
Canaan”, justified the annihilation of the Natives 
with the Biblical injunction against Amalek. The 
Zionist “pioneers” resemble the white settlers in 
America, the bad Palestinians are a new version of 
the “Bad Injuns”63.  
Other arguments exist on this issue such as that of Steven 
Salaita –Holy Land in Transit- where he assimilates between Israel 
and the US in terms of using the rhetoric of religion, analyzed through 
the framework of settler colonialism, a framework that had faded in its 
use in the academic scene for decades. As Peter Gran argues in the 
preface of Salaita’s book, The Holy Land in Transit: Colonialism and 
the Quest for Canaan, the paradigm was used in the past by the likes 
of Maxime Rodinson in the 1950s and 1960s to speak of Israel. Yet, in 
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the last two decades the concept of settler colonialism as an analytical 
framework has gained credence in the academic scene and is now 
being used again to analyze policies of certain states, as well as a tool 
for comparison. The notion of the settler colonial paradigm exists in 
that a group of a population, usually European and white, would leave 
their original homeland and move somewhere else to build a new 
community that is democratic and that spreads progress and 
civilization or religion, but the contradiction lays in that this new 
settler society is built upon the deprivation of whoever locals existed 
before it exists due to this initial moment of colonization. Peter Gran 
tells us that, until 1967, Israel did to a large extent experience this 
kind of settler colonial mentality, defending its existence on 
Palestinian land, continually justifying the creation of Israel at the 
expense of the Palestinian tragedy, either by denying it, or by using all 
these similarities between the American early colonial discourse and 
the Israeli Zionist arguments for colonizing Palestine. This, however, 
does not mean that these similarities between the Israeli and the 
American experience no longer exists or no longer affects the 
relationship between America and Israel simply because the classical 
settler colonial model is no longer there. “Financial and philosophical 
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American support for Israel remains integral to Israel’s survival and 
has long been criticized as imperialist by opponents of the Israeli 
occupation. Yet these criticisms rarely interrogate the covenantal 
relationship these nations share, which tacitly pervades the American 
consciousness because of the United States’ own grounding in Holy 
Land pathos”64. This relationship continues, not in the same crude, 
prehistoric, or very openly religious manner as existed before, but, as 
Salaita explains, through all these deeply imbued discursive 
mechanisms that remain in the American and the Israeli mentality in 
the way they view themselves and the people around them, including 
the indigenous peoples, it exists in the history and the tradition built 
over several years of cooperation and alliance, and it exists also 
among the religious groups that still use the language that is inspired 
from the religious texts and discourses that originally founded the 
settler colonial experience in America and Israel. Furthermore, this 
relationship still exists in popular culture. Salaita attempts to bring 
further clarity to the issue by comparing the Native Americans to the 
Palestinians. In both instances, Salaita focuses on discussing the 
religious tone adopted by foreign settlers in these lands. Salaita draws 
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further on the writings of Keith Whitelam and Hilton Obenzinger, 
who explored the mentality of the Holy Land of the American frontier 
in “American Palestine”. In accordance with the narratives of Western 
civilization, Europeans set out to claim new lands, and claim those in 
these lands as “economic dependents under the sovereignty of God”, 
which, as Salaita explains, affects the Indigenous societies in three 
ways: first, the silencing of their histories “in place of Western 
metanarratives of progress and liberation”, second, lands are seized 
“under the alleged authority of God”, and third, “the discourse of 
conquest is ultimately incorporated into all aspects of the colonizer’s 
popular and intellectual institutions, becoming normalized and 
perceived as natural over time”65. Salaita notes that the linkage of 
Indigenous struggles is inevitable: “Contemporary scholars and 
activists have the task of rethinking today’s dynamic forms of 
colonialism in a world where globalization has become the dominant 
economic axiom. A fertile area of contestation can be found in 
Indigenous scholarship and in the literature of national liberation 
movements”66. Through discussing the struggles of Native Americans 
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and Palestinians, Salaita, in addition to other authors mentioned in his 
book, stress on the key components of identity and land, to which both 
Native Americans and Palestinians considered to be one of the major 
facets of their struggles; “the assertion of national identity is not only 
fundamental to intellectual production, but also a cultural valorization 
running counter to the systematic erasure of Indigeneity in the modern 
imagination”67. On the indigenous connection to land, Salaita writes: 
“Natives and Palestinian discourses, however, clearly show that land 
is a central component of identity, spirituality, and philosophy. While 
Natives and Palestinians usually describe sovereignty and self-
determination as key features that define their work, these concepts 
are bankrupt without an autonomous land base on which to survive 
and flourish”68. Furthermore, Salaita displays the different writings of 
both Native Americans and Palestinians regarding their similarities, as 
well as their understanding of their own identities and nationalisms. 
While reflecting on writers such as Silko, Warrior, Ashrawi, and Said, 
Salaita writes: “Natives and Palestinians are pulled between a 
commonsensical understanding of nationalism’s dangers, on the one 
hand, and deep cultural impulses that stress national liberation, on the 
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other”69. Such negotiations have no space within the context of 
postcolonial theory; hence, Salaita opts for the need for new 
perspectives that are based on tangible realities. The Zionists also 
discuss this comparison but utilize it in a negative way, stating the 
comparisons, and then noting that, since it is a similar situation, how 
then, would it make sense to return land to the Palestinians; should 
America be returned to the Native Americans? A rhetorical question 
exemplifying their steadfast notion that the natives have no rights in 
America, and the same applies to Palestinians. Through the 
comparison of Native Americans and Palestinians, US support to 
Israel is further clarified: “American rhetoric in support of Israel is 
therefore a discourse to which Americans are accustomed. Patriotic 
socialization requires the erasure of Indigenous rights; Israelis thus 
enjoy American patronage with a history that can be traced to the 
appearance in North America of the first Europeans. These historical 
realities are incisive in understanding American acceptance of Israeli 
brutality; calculated misinformation and monetary support for 
settlements succeed because they are tainted by racist suppositions 
immediately familiar to Americans as the natural course of events. 
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The covenant brought by settlers into both lands constantly crosses the 
Atlantic”70. With the passage of time, exodus narratives continue to be 
swapped from ancient fables into a “competitive arena wherein force 
is required to legitimize the validity of the settler society by elevating 
its narratives to the status of national history”71. During this process, 
indigenous claims to land are constantly delegitimized, and slowly 
swept into the background, sometimes becoming labeled as fables 
themselves.  
After 1967, Israel tried to establish itself, like all old colonial 
societies, as a normal country, not to remain forever as a contested 
space. The occupied Palestinian territories became the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, and the rest of the land is no longer Palestine, but is now 
considered Israel; the land of the Jews that is no longer contested or 
discussed or debated, even in international law today. What were the 
original founding elements of resemblance between the American 
settler colonial experience and the Israeli settler colonial experience 
according to the original settler colonial model? One cannot ignore all 
the biblical parallels that were used by American settlers comparing 
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their experience to that of the original chosen people; the biblical 
Jews’ entrance into Palestine, in addition to the naming of American 
towns after old biblical names, especially the ones founded early on; 
an issue that Salaita discusses in detail. Salaita notes that there are 
more than twenty towns in the United States named Canaan or New 
Canaan, as well as many towns named Palestine, located in Illinois, 
Texas, and West Virginia. He writes: “an important irony can be 
found here. In the Near East, the lands of Canaan and Palestine –in 
biblical times and in 1948- were eradicated in place of something new, 
only to reappear in the United States in place of something already 
there”. Salaita relates this town naming to the initial Judeo-Christian 
involvement during the second-wave settlers to America, he adds: “it 
was perhaps inevitable that some newly established towns would 
adopt monikers conjuring the Holy Land, indicating that this pristine 
land of milk and honey was ripe for religious and material 
settlement”72. The literary notion of the Jews advancing into the 
promised land of milk and honey that was promised to them by God 
was paralleled with the notion of exterminating and removing the 
people who existed in this land, as it was not an empty land, but that 
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the divine promise was associated with the obligation and the 
permission to remove the native people. Even in the biblical narrative, 
the notion of the locals as a background that can be eliminated in 
favor of this manifest destiny already exists. This is a major issue that 
Americans and Israelis identify with, how both of their histories were 
forged through eliminating the locals. Obenzinger and Whitelam 
discuss the issue of the “Holy Land mania”, which Obenzinger traces 
to the early nineteenth century, and which finds its links in both early 
American colonial discourse, and in the early development of 
Zionism. “The source of settler and, later, national identity has 
remained identical on both continents”. Furthermore, early 
developments of both Zionism and Americanism follow similar 
patterns in the manner by which identification was constructed, as 
noted in the following excerpt from American Palestine: “Certainly, 
Zionist ideological formation, as a secular movement, initially 
appeared to move against traditional notions of Jewish uniqueness in a 
desire to establish a ‘normal’ national life. I would argue, however, 
that the covenantal relationship is in fact at play even in such a 
seemingly inverted dynamic inscribed by early secular Zionists, just as 
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it is also at play with Anglo-American colonial development, despite 
its great hybridity”73.  
The elements of the settler colonial discourse can be 
summarized into three main pillars: the religious one, linking the two 
nations with biblical roots and comparisons, the argument of 
civilization, in that these ‘superior’ people have the responsibility to 
spread civilization to the rest of the ‘savage’ world, and the notion of 
“chosen-ness”, under which the people view themselves as superior to 
all others.  
Under the umbrella of the notion of the chosen people comes the 
American idea of Manifest Destiny, which focuses on making yourself 
a subject above all others, so that your own destiny somehow 
supersedes all others, your religious myth is more important than 
theirs, and is actually more important than their very own existence. 
This notion of Manifest Destiny was the destiny of whites to civilize 
the world and civilize America: working the land and exploiting all 
the potential that exists there. This may be seen as some sort of 
Hegelian movement in history, something that was unstoppable, so 
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that the place of the natives themselves does not exist anymore, as if 
you cannot avoid what happened to them, and many people write 
history this way. The term originated in the nineteenth century, and 
was based on the American belief that they were destined to expand 
across the continent. The term was used to justify the war with 
Mexico in the 1840s, and which combined the idea of expansionism 
with other notions such as American exceptionalism and romantic 
nationalism. The ideology of the expansion toward the West; until 
1870, white Americans lived in only a small part of what is now the 
United States, natives still owned three quarters of America, then 
came the American expansion, the founding of the American nation, 
the West ward push is what created America today; the period during 
which most Indians were dispossessed and slaughtered, and the period 
during which most Indian wars took place. The ideological, quasi-
religious, nationalistic discourse that covered all these acts was this 
notion of Manifest Destiny. This concept originated to guise the 
expansionist origins of the United States, which was brought forth 
through expanding notions of the need to bring liberty, justice, and 
democracy to the world, ensuring that the United States is the ultimate 
‘agent of liberty’, and will continue to expand until ‘liberty’ has 
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reached across the entire world, as the US President noted: “we have 
lit a fire as well- a fire in the minds of men. It warms those who feel 
its power, it burns those who fight its progress, and one day this 
untamed fire of freedom will reach the darkest corners of our 
world”74. The idea not only relates to bringing ‘liberty’ to the world, 
but also that only through this liberty will America’s security be 
ensured: “only when the light of freedom’s untamed fire illuminates 
the world’s darkest corner will America’s own safety and prosperity 
be assured”75. Looking at the era of Manifest Destiny and the era of 
Zionist expansion in Palestine, one finds a number of parallelisms in 
terms of “chosen-ness”, in terms of civilizing the land, in terms of the 
nationalist/religious myth, and in terms of the way the natives were 
relegated to a secondary background. All these parallels can be noted 
under the approach of the classical notion of settler colonialism. On 
the notion of Manifest Destiny in Palestine, Salaita writes: “the issue 
of Manifest Destiny in Palestine warrants interrogation, because the 
notion that one people’s scriptural prophesies override the rights of 
another people’s very existence is, in fact, the theological framework 
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of New World conquest. The covenantal aspect of settler colonialism 
has bound Natives and Palestinians to the same class of resistance 
despite the great difference in their cultures”76.  
Although the post-1967 case in Israel no longer follows the classical 
discourse of settler colonialism (although the settlements’ expansion is 
a central core of settler colonialism), it is still possible to find many 
elements in the American discourse on Israel that is inspired from this 
classical notion; the long-time American material and political support 
for Israel as the only civilized outpost in the Middle East; pioneer 
language still exists when discussing Israel, it is probably the only 
place in the world where the notion of exclusive religious identity is 
discussed as a moral issue, and this is primarily because it is a state for 
the Jews, if it were a state for the Shi’a for example, it would not have 
received the same support as it does, nor would it have been seen as a 
legitimate political objective. Salaita speaks of these distinctions and 
how they express themselves on the literary level, not only in terms of 
the experience of the colonialist colonizers, but also in terms of the 
similarities of the experiences of the indigenous peoples who were 
subjected to these mechanisms of colonialism. Salaita speaks of how 
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the indigenous people represent themselves and not how the colonists 
represent them or themselves. Salaita speaks of the people who were 
subjected to this same sort of religious pioneer discourse, and how 
they reacted.  
Americans are more apt to justify Israel’s view of the Palestinians in 
light of its own self-perception, the same way the Americans dealt 
with the Native Americans. Today, the Israel lobby and many other 
proponents of Israel return to these old biblical notions in order to 
further stress the close relationship between the two countries, almost 
to remind the United States of the comparison it once made in the past 
to the biblical Jews. There is a clear intention aimed at the American 
audience when retrieving common grounds between America and 
Israel, furthermore, they speak exactly what Americans themselves 
want to hear. To the religious Americans they speak with a religious 
tongue, bringing them to visit the holy land, to the secular Americans 
they speak with a secular tongue, arguing for Israel as the only 
democracy and civilized nation in the Middle East to which America 
has shared interests, and to the Jews they speak Jewish. Understanding 
this relationship on all its levels is primary to understanding the 
outcome of this relationship, and its ulterior motives for colonization, 
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as Salaita notes: “the ethnocratic, not national characteristics of the 
United States and Israel are nearly identical; their deep camaraderie is 
not merely strategic, nor is it accidental. Understanding the interplay 
between these governments on all levels will create possibilities to 
identify and implicate the narratives underscoring neoliberalism, the 
West’s latest form of colonialism”77.  
Other parallels can be found such as the notion of the “Jewish 
Cowboys” and “Arab Indians”, developed by Amos Kenan, former 
columnist for the Israeli daily Ha’aretz. Kenan believes that these 
characterizations accurately reflect the dynamics at play in Zionism, 
whether or not they had any philosophical basis outside American 
history. Kenan asserts that although Zionism’s discursive substructure 
may be rooted in a biblical basis, “the realities it encountered in 
Palestine converted it to a form of dogma whereby the Palestinians 
were transformed conceptually into the Indians from across the ocean. 
Once the Jewish cowboys actually began their ethnic cleansing, the 
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Palestinians were transformed into the physical remnants of Indian 
memory”78. 
Another major author on this topic is Mahmoud Mamdani, who, 
in his book, Good Muslim Bad Muslim, writes about the ideological 
compassion between US and Israel in terms of imperialism. The main 
contribution or import of Mamdani is the cultural and linguistic 
explanation of the affinity between America and Israel, as opposed to 
the materialist economistic one of Chomsky and the realist political 
one of Walt and Mearsheimer, he uses violence as the material with 
which to explain this cultural phenomenon. 
One important notion discussed by Mamdani in his book is the 
addendum to the concept of Manifest Destiny. Whereas Walt and 
Measrsheimer provide an extremely realist notion of relations between 
the United States and Israel, and as in the realist school of thought, the 
only issues that get factored into the equation are interests, power, 
relative balances of power, and rationality, in the sense of whether 
rational decisions are being made or not. A large aspect of the Arab-
Israeli conflict and the practices of both Israel and America on the 
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ground become excised from the narrative of thinkers such as 
Mearsheimer and Walt due to the perspective from which they view 
the world, which is that of power, violence, and war; even war is only 
factored in as an element of power. On the other hand, if we are 
talking about the international society and national societies and 
culture, these are, in civilizational terms, issues that are more alive 
than simple numbers or other issues on the minds of policy makers; 
how do you justify genocide, how do you narrate a history that 
involves ethnic cleansing; such issues interact with other elements in 
history just as much as interests and decisions of policy makers do. 
Here, Mamdani discusses the historical and rational justification of 
violence verses what is considered to be uncivilized and irrational 
violence, and discusses how civilization in history seemed to be on the 
side of rational violence, while they intentionally abhorred, 
condemned, and failed to understand the unjustified violence, 
asserting it as something that cannot be dealt with or negotiated with; 
the same discourse prevailed more recently in history after the events 
of 9/11 with regards to terrorism. Mamdani offers an interesting 
contribution on the notion of violence which is also embedded in 
Israeli relations toward the Palestinians and the American relationship 
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with Native Americans and then with the colonized and semi-
colonized nations around the world; notions that are entirely absent 
from the arguments of Measrsheimer and Walt. Mamdani focuses on 
the idea of how Western centric discourses and notions of history have 
created these different categorizations of violence, which justify and 
legitimate some forms of violence while delegitimizing others, all 
decided by the manner in which they are explained. Hence, according 
to Mamdani, the narrative for the advancement of the progress of 
Manifest Destiny that was described above creates forms of violence 
that are viewed as benign, good, and necessary, or even when 
regretful, as with regards to the American genocide of Natives; it was 
seen as a rational, justified, and necessary violence that was inevitable 
and that was part of a movement of history, and that cannot be 
eliminated from history. Mamdani also discusses the different 
arguments proposed in America when people discuss the issue of 
Native Americans; oftentimes people ask: “What do you want? Do 
you want us to undo history? Give them back the land?” questions 
presented in a context as if the evolution of history occurred in a 
perfect way and cannot be modified or retraced in any different 
manner, making it impossible to imagine an alternative history where 
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these injustices did not occur; these injustices no longer become 
considered as a form of violence, but are now seen as part of the 
march of history, the Hegelian notion of history that goes in a certain 
direction. The same goes for the Israeli idea of civilizing the native 
Palestinians and enforcing a violence that is necessary to secure their 
own state. At the same time, the same acts of violence, killing, and 
murder that is committed by the colonized, or any kind of violence 
that does not fit in this Western centric narrative of progress is 
described and relegated to a different category where it becomes seen 
as either a product of metaphysical notions such as evil, or a result of 
moral depravity, such as Nazism.   
While Mearsheimer and Walt somehow miss this entire range of 
social phenomena relating to imperialism and to the meeting of power, 
Chomsky asserts a notion where imperialism is stressed, where the 
notion of exploitation is stressed, even violence is stressed, but that is 
also always explained in more or less rationalistic, material terms: 
interests, economy, world system, how the economic system forces 
countries to prepare a suitable political environment for the model of 
capitalist accumulation, etc. While Mamdani locates these notions of 
violence and imperialism more in the discursive, linguistic, and 
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cultural level, through investigating both how this notion of culture 
exists in the first place, so that we define ourselves in terms of and 
within this culture; always fictive and varying and changing cultural 
boundaries, east, west, civilized, uncivilized, etc., he also explains 
how violence and methods of exploitation are couched in a cultural 
and linguistic context. Mamdani examines such notions to show how 
the civilized and developed world justifies past imperialism and 
oppression through discourses such as that of Manifest Destiny and 
the rationalization of violence. Furthermore, Mamdani investigates the 
creation of the notion of “us” and “them” in a cultural sense, which is 
the basis of the American-Israeli affinity; creating a larger “us” verses 
“them”. Most of his book discusses this cultural process where the 
“other” is created and becomes a separate entity, in this sense, he 
interrogates the notion of how the West came to be created and how it 
progressed and changed over time, and how it now came to refer to 
anyone who is Western, even those living in the east, as in Israel, and 
those who are democratic and industrialized are now considered to be 
part of the West. Furthermore, US policy creates a commonality 
between different groups that it views as a “threat” to its own security 
in order to further promote this notion of the “other”, as Andrew 
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Bacevich notes: “Treating Nazism, communism, and Islamism as 
essentially interchangeable, while ignoring their fundamental and 
irreconcilable differences, testifies to the enduring value of using (or 
devising) some sort of diabolical “other” as a reference point when 
selling policy”79.  
Thus, this camp provides us with an alternative perspective to 
approach the question of the Israel Lobby; instead of focusing 
exclusively on an analysis of political and economic interests and on 
hegemonic agendas, authors such as Kenan, Salaita, and Mamdani 
highlight the cultural and discursive facets of political phenomena. 
More specifically, these authors alert us to the fact that political life is 
not merely the reflection of a rational calculation of interests; instead, 
political actions are couched within a discursive frame as part of a 
dialectic relationship: even “pursuing interests” implies a discursive 
creation of the notion of the “national interest”, which is thought up 
and expressed in cultural terms. It is impossible to imagine a 
formulation of the “national interest” that is not embedded in a 
cultural discourse as well as a specific definition of “rationality” and 
“the good”. Likewise, culture cannot be seen in isolation from these 
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political phenomena, which, in turn, induce reactions, commentary, 
and responses to new challenges on the part of society.    
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Conclusion  
The expose displayed in this research presents the process of 
Israeli-US relations, which, like many other phenomena, can be seen 
in a very legitimate way and from different facets; it can be seen as an 
issue of international relations, it can be seen as a social phenomenon 
with ramifications that effect a large group of people across the globe, 
it can be seen as a question of power, it can be seen as an economic 
issue, and it can also been seen through its integration into larger 
issues at play. The reason behind the existence of so many different 
ways of interpreting the Israeli influence and US-Israeli relations is 
due to the fact that each of these camps has been constructing the 
notion of US-Israeli relations in a different symbolic space, or a 
different perspective; basically shaping the issue in terms of how they 
view the world. As many observers of the debate between 
Measheimer/Walt and Chomsky/Massad and others have pointed out, 
interestingly, not all of the theories and interpretations made about 
American-Israeli relations are mutually exclusive; they do not always 
contradict each other, and they do not always presume that the other 
explanation is invalid, in fact, the matter of the issue is that they 
simply work on different levels; which is a further enforcement to the 
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notion that these differences mostly originate from the manner by 
which the question is conceived. Why does this happen? Why do we 
tackle one topic and end up with different constructions and 
interpretations of the same question and issue? A very valid 
explanation with regards to the arguments presented in this research is 
that they made choices; choices on how to view the world, how to 
construct international relations, and how to conceive of social life. 
This can be done for many reasons, but, with regards to the arguments 
presented in this research, we can say that this choice was political; 
they may have to do with politics as we know it, relating to people’s 
ideological affiliations, but also with disciplinary politics: are these 
theories being examined from a political science background, or 
sociology, or international relations, which effects how you view the 
world. It may be political in terms of the research that is being 
requested at the moment or that is most popular, it may be the result of 
theoretical and philosophical differences on how one thinks of power 
and how it works. Each one of these perspectives or choices highlights 
certain aspects, but also hides others. One relevant example is that of 
John Mearsheimer, who, unlike Chomsky and Massad and others, 
never alludes to the notions of imperialism and power; in fact, these 
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notions are glossed over and labeled under the notion of American 
national interest. Unlike Chomsky and Massad, who continually argue 
about how this idea of American national interest is affecting the 
world, for Mearsheimer, it is a presumed notion that serves as a 
dependent variable in his research, in which he looks at how this 
notion of American national interest is affected by the Israeli lobby, 
hence, it is taken for granted as a notion we wish to serve and 
maximize. This may probably be the type of critique that Massad was 
trying to display when addressing Mearsheimer; the underlying fact 
that these scholars in fact agree with the imperialist paradigm in which 
American-Israeli relations are situated, but they want to serve this 
paradigm in a different manner.  
How does one interpret US-Israeli relations? The conclusion that can 
be acquired by this research is that any interpretation of this relation 
requires a political choice, and because it is part of a troublesome 
topic that is rife with political choices that we are constantly making, 
whether one is formulating a research agenda or choosing a path of 
study, and since each of the choices one wishes to make in order to 
arrive at an ultimate conclusion is political, one must attempt to 
understand which elements are being highlighted in this process, and 
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which are being hidden and marginalized; one must be aware of this 
issue while making choices.  
As social scientists, it is important to attempt to understand why each 
camp made the choices that they made, and then, we must assess and 
decide which argument is more valid than the other, since in this field, 
many explanations can be correct, but with deeper analysis and 
investigation, we may find that some of these explanations can be 
more correct than others. This problem arises with regards to this 
specific topic, since when you apply the criteria for validity, one may 
find that many of the arguments put forth are equally valid. Due to the 
fact that this topic is both a heated and troublesome one, and for the 
purpose of this research, it is important not to pick and choose which 
argument is more valid than the other, but instead to look at how these 
arguments can be seen in a larger context that can effect the situation 
in the Arab World, and especially in Palestine.  
The above three arguments must not necessarily be viewed in 
contradiction to one another, although there is a difference in the 
narrative utilized in each one. All three scenarios continue to result in 
the same American support for Israeli policies, but each argument 
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provides a different narrative; a different explanation and a different 
solution. If the Israeli lobby is the “tail that wags the dog”, then it is 
enough to defeat pro-Israeli power in Washington DC to achieve 
change in American policy. If it is imperialism, then one must defeat 
America or the American imperialist logic itself, because even if all of 
the Jewish population disappeared from the face of the earth, the 
United States will continue to support Israel, or, if not Israel, as 
Massad argues, it will support any other system or order that rejects 
concepts of Arab nationalism and the liberation of Palestine and the 
independence of these national countries.  
What is the common cause that fuels the engines of American Israeli 
relations? Many answers can provide yet another starting point to 
understanding this intricate and complex relationship. Power could be 
one issue, cultural affinity could be another, even other arguments can 
factor into the answer, such as the writings of Mamdani, through 
which we can see that the Israelis and Americans in fact think of 
themselves as one people, as part of one civilizational sphere, sharing 
an ideological perspective of the world, they see themselves as facing 
an entire world of barbarians that disagree with everything they 
believe in. The notion of power can even be further argued, as they do 
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not always see themselves as the powerful people; America sees itself 
as this shinning city on the hill that is surrounded by evil, Israel sees 
itself as besieged by far larger enemies. The matter of perspective 
must always be kept in mind when trying to acquire an answer to this 
issue. Sometimes we may put on the spectacles of Mearsheimer and 
Walt to look at the relationship, and then we may turn to another 
perspective. This is not an either/or situation; one can be looking at 
the same thing from different perspectives. Even if no one clear 
answer exists, it is still important to understand the different answers 
provided, in order to understand the larger picture of how the 
American-Israeli relationship has, and continues to impact the Arab 
world, especially Palestine. 
Each approach lacks something that the other two can complement. 
Together, they can better explain how and why US-Israeli relations 
are getting stronger and to the disadvantage of the Palestinians. The 
fact of the matter is that, no matter which perspective we view the 
topic from, the United States and Israel hold a special relationship that 
is intertwined through different factors. The Israel lobby, US 
imperialism, and the ideological affinity between the two countries 
have created a well-linked American-Israeli team that will not allow 
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anything to stand in its face. What does this mean for Palestine? In 
light of this special relationship, Palestinians must begin to adopt a 
new approach to their conflict by thinking outside of negotiations, 
outside of US/European mediation, and must bring back the question 
of Palestine to its Arab context; Palestinian refugees, Israeli wars of 
aggression, illegal settlements, and, most importantly, to bring back 
their focus on the natural allies of people with common interests and 
experiences in this Western modern global structure. The anti-
imperialist approach to the Palestine question must return, and with it, 
Palestinians must link themselves to all forces and groups opposed to 
the American led Western global hegemony. Palestinians must 
allocate the common threads between the different peoples and 
communities that share their thirst for freedom and equality, and that 
have in the past, or still are until today, suffering the burdens of 
oppression and injustice. Mexicans, South Africans, Haitians, Native 
Americans, and other people in the South, as well as those in 
opposition to Western imperialism in the North may all pose an 
important link through which Palestinians can learn from. 
Furthermore, the new born Arab Spring can serve as an even more 
important lesson, especially since it serves as a large scale incident 
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that is occurring and inevitably impacting all countries in the region, 
including Palestine, where people, more than leaders and 
governments, matter.  
In order to arrive at a clear and well-rounded conclusion to this 
research, a coherent interpretation of US-Israeli relations must take 
into account the social aspect of these relations. More importantly, it 
must acknowledge the victims of the outcome of these relations, the 
victims of the policies implemented as a result of these relations, since 
these victims themselves are the cohorts that are calling for a change 
in world politics. 
I argue for an understanding of US-Israeli relations that links political 
decisions to their social ramifications, which includes the perspective 
of the victims, not simply because of moral reasons, or for the sake of 
illuminating a different area of research, but because the victims of 
these power relations are not passive; when policies and acts are made 
as a result of these relations, these victims tend to react. These 
reactions also feed back into the imperial policy and the kind of 
challenges it faces –as the case has been throughout the history of 
imperialism. One of the lacunas in the analysis of Mearsheimer and 
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Walt (and, to a lesser extent, Chomsky) was that their exclusive focus 
on foreign policy processes obfuscates the challenges that the 
American system has continually faced due to the resistance of society 
(at home and abroad). US policymakers are not capable of shaping the 
world (or their own government) without limitations. The Vietnam 
War, the Iraq War, and the Palestinian dossier are clear examples of 
an imperial power whose ambitions were curbed due to the emergence 
of a social resistance that was not predicted by the policymakers.   
To understand these relations one must view them in their historical 
evolution and how they effect social processes whether in America or 
in the Middle East, in order to see how these reactions feed back into 
the political process and decision making, as well as the 
conceptualization of US-Israeli relations. This especially applies to the 
Arab Spring, since these types of American-Israeli collusions and this 
current international setting was, and still is, a battlefield; part of the 
battlefield of the Arab Spring relating to how such revolutions will be 
presented and who will govern and manage the countries in which 
they occur, how will the history of this era be written, etc. America is 
evidently strongly engaged in these revolutions.  
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The US position and its contradictions were seen at full display in the 
case of Tunisia. After decades of strong relations with the repressive 
Tunisian regime, complete with deep military and security ties
80
, the 
White House quickly turned against its old ally Ben Ali, but only after 
ascertaining that the Tunisian Revolution had succeeded in eroding his 
regime. In the post-911 period, Ben Ali became a key American ally 
in the context of the US-led Global War on Terrorism; the Tunisian 
President was able to gain the favor of the George W. Bush 
administration by taking a public stance in support of the US position 
on “terrorism”81. Along with the French and European diplomacies, 
the US had – for years – heaped praise upon Ben Ali’s regime and its 
alleged socio-economic “achievements”, often mentioning Tunisia as 
a model to be emulated in the region – a view that also spread into US 
and European academic circles
82
. Once the revolution broke out, the 
United States abstained from directing any criticism toward the Ben 
Ali regime or taking a position in support of the Tunisian protesters, 
expressing, instead, neutral statements of “concern” amid calls for 
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“calm”.83American criticism due to the excessive use of force only 
began once the revolution began to spread, and Ben Ali’s fall 
appeared imminent; eventually, it was only after Ben Ali’s flight from 
the country, on January 14, 2011, that the US President made a 
statement welcoming the revolution and supporting democracy in 
Tunisia (while also volunteering advice and guidance to the Tunisians 
during the transitional phase).
84
   
The Arab Spring is clear proof that these victims are not passive, and 
is further proof of how political action and political reaction and 
resistance can emanate from unexpected places. A brief review of the 
history of the Arab-Israeli conflict and US-Israeli relations shows that 
such incidents have always happened: Israel wanted to defeat Gamal 
Abdel Nasser; it did, but then it was met with Palestinian resistance 
and the PLO, it then assumes that it simply needs to defeat the PLO, 
prompting an invasion of Beirut in order to uproot the PLO, resulting 
in a process of occupation that produced its current fearsome enemy: 
Hezbollah – an enemy they did not anticipate or predict; back in 1982.  
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If Hezbollah was also to be defeated, Israel will likely be met with a 
new – perhaps more radical - reaction. The Arab Spring is part of this 
dynamic. Today, the matter is no longer solely about the advancement 
of policies; today, there is resistance to these policies, resistance to the 
acts that have left individuals and societies in bitter conditions and 
standards of living; these individuals are no longer passive, but are 
taking to the streets in protest of these conditions, they are calling for 
a change in the regimes that have been implanted as a result of US 
policies – policies that were inevitably shaped in light of US-Israeli 
relations.  
What we find in the end is that these three approaches talk to each 
other without often stating so directly. It is possible to use these three 
approaches to complement one another, even if one is not 
ideologically driven, in order to bring back the picture to why Israel 
and the United States have such a close relationship.  
This, in turn, should lead Palestinians to take matters in their own 
hands, especially with regards to the ongoing conflict with Israel. The 
US should no longer be seen as a mediator nor should it be in any way 
involved in the Palestinian-Israeli / Arab-Israeli conflicts, but agency 
must be brought back to local society, and to the people themselves, 
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who are the agents of change. The ongoing changes in the Arab 
region, alongside steadfastness in a return to mobilizing the people 
can allow more voice for the people. Palestinians must look to the 
people rather than regimes; they must look South and East and forget 
about the governments in the North and West. One final push is 
required in order to mobilize, gather, and promote the power of the 
people over the power of politics.  
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